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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the role of unconventional monetary policy as a source of time-variation 
in the relationship between sovereign bond yield spreads and their fundamental determinants. 
We use a two-step empirical approach. First, we apply a time-varying parameter panel modelling 
framework to determine shifts in the pricing regime characterising sovereign bond markets in 
the euro area over the period January 1999 to July 2016. Second, we estimate the impact of ECB 
policy interventions on the time-varying risk factor sensitivities of spreads. Our results provide 
evidence of a new bond-pricing regime following the announcement of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) programme in August 2012. This regime is characterised by a weakened 
link between spreads and fundamentals, but with higher spreads relative to the pre-crisis period 
and residual redenomination risk. We also find that unconventional monetary policy measures 
affect the pricing of sovereign risk not only directly, but also indirectly through changes in 
banking risk. Overall, the actions of the ECB have operated as catalysts for reversing the 
dynamics of the European sovereign debt crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
The European sovereign debt crisis has dominated the international economic debate in 
recent years. It has posed an existential threat for the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), largely monopolised the agenda of policy makers and triggered a vast academic literature 
on the subject. Within the latter, one may distinguish four related but distinct branches. First, 
theoretical models of the EMU crisis highlighting the role of changes in market expectations as 
a key driver of the crisis’ evolution (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas, 2011; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). 
Second, empirical studies investigating the fundamental determinants of EMU long-term 
government bond yield spreads against Germany. These document significant time-variation in 
the relationship, specifically a shift from a pre-crisis to a crisis-related bond pricing regime 
(Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012, Afonso et al. 2014, 2015). Third, 
the role of banking risk in transforming the global financial crisis of 2008/09 into the sovereign 
debt crisis, and the nexus between banking risk and sovereign risk (Alter and Schüler, 2012; De 
Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014). Finally, a fourth branch investigates the 
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy actions by the European Central Bank (ECB) 
to stabilise sovereign bond markets. Most of these studies analyse the Security Markets 
Programme (SMP) and the effect of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) announcement, 
while a few more recent papers consider the ECB’s Quantitative Easing (QE) programme.1 They 
typically find that the ECB policy interventions are associated with lower spreads without, 
however, identifying the channels via which they affect spreads.2 
                                                 
1 The SMP commenced on May 2010 and involved the purchase of sovereign bonds from euro area periphery 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) during 2010-2011.  For studies on the impact of SMP on 
spreads see, among others, Eser and Schwaab (2013), Ghysels et al. (2014) and Trebesch and Zettelmeyer (2014). 
The OMT was announced on 2 August 2012, following the statement by President Draghi on 26 July 2012 that the 
“ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. The technical framework for the OMT was revealed on 
6 September 2012 and on the same date the SMP was terminated. Altavilla et al. (2014) evaluate the reaction of 
spreads to the OMT announcement, while Krishnamurthy et al. (2015), Szczerbowicz (2015) and Gibson et al. 
(2016) examine both the SMP and the OMT. The QE programme was announced in January 2015 and is effective 
since March 2015. It involves the monthly purchase of euro area sovereign bonds, as well as other assets. The impact 
of QE on spreads is analysed in Altavilla et al. (2015) and De Santis (2016). 
2 An exception is the study of Krishnamurthy et al. (2015), who decompose the policy impact on sovereign yields 
into effects via default risk, market segmentation and redenomination risk. They find that default risk and market 
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This paper brings together multiple branches of the literature on the European debt crisis by 
investigating the hypothesis that the relationship linking spreads with fundamentals is affected 
by the behaviour of the ECB. In other words, we posit that policy interventions may alter the 
underlying bond pricing regime. This hypothesis reflects notably the insights from the theoretical 
models of the European sovereign debt crisis quoted above. The key prediction of these models 
relates to the possibility of multiple equilibria in the relationship between spreads and 
fundamentals. Drawing on models of currency crises (e.g. Obstfeld, 1986, 1996), they predict 
that the variable determining which of the possible multiple equilibria will eventually prevail is 
the status of redenomination/default expectations held by the private sector. Under favourable 
expectations, markets impose small penalties on risk factors, determining spreads at relatively 
low levels. An adverse shift in expectations results into higher penalties on risk factors and 
relatively high spread values. The ECB, through its actions and a conditional guarantee that it is 
ready to operate as a lender of last resort (LLR), can improve expectations and thereby generate 
a shift in bond pricing behaviour.  
To explore this hypothesis, we adopt a two-step empirical approach. Fist, we employ a time-
varying parameter (TVP) panel econometric methodology to capture changes in the relationship 
between 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their fundamental 
determinants (global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk). We present results for a panel 
of ten EMU countries over the period January 1999 to July 2016, as well as its core and periphery 
countries constituent sub-panels. This part of our analysis extends previous research on the time-
varying relationship between spreads and fundamentals, whose samples typically end in 2010/11, 
into the period following the announcement of the OMT and Quantitative Easing (QE) 
programmes. The evolution of the TVP estimates obtained for the EMU panels allows us, in 
combination with results obtained for a non-EMU control panel, to shed light on the validity of 
                                                 
segmentation are the dominant channels through which the SMP and OMT worked in Italy and Spain, while 
redenomination risk may have been a policy channel in Spain and Portugal. 
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the multiple equilibria view of the European sovereign debt crisis vis-à-vis alternative 
explanations of the crisis, such as the wake-up call hypothesis (Goldstein, 1998; Beirne and 
Fratzscher, 2013; Bekaert et al., 2014); and changes in the market’s assessment regarding future 
macroeconomic convergence/divergence (Aizenman et al., 2013).  Second, we model the series 
of TVP coefficients estimated for each of the spreads’ determinants on a dummy variable 
capturing the effects of the OMT announcement and empirical measures of ECB monetary policy 
(conventional and unconventional). Moreover, we control for the effects of bank credit risk in 
the euro area. 
With regards the determinants of spreads, we confirm the main finding of previous studies 
and extend them with a significant new one. Specifically, we document a change in the EMU 
bond-pricing regime from risk under-pricing before the global financial crisis, where the 
sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals is zero or near zero, to a regime involving increasingly 
larger penalties on risk factors and very high spreads.3 In addition to these two regimes, however, 
we identify a third pricing regime, triggered by the announcement of the OMT in August 2012 
and characterised by a weakening of the link between spreads and their underlying fundamentals. 
This regime-shift has not been reported in previous studies, except from Delatte et al. (2017) 
who conclude that it represents a restoration of the first (pre-crisis/non-crisis) regime, driven by 
a decline in bank credit risk. We argue, however, that the third regime is new and different from 
the first one, with the main distinguishing factors being higher spreads relative to the pre-crisis 
era and a residual redenomination risk in periphery countries, carried over from the second 
(crisis) regime.  
                                                 
3 Earlier studies typically document the switch from a pre-crisis to a crisis-related bond pricing regime using fixed-
parameter models and imposing exogenous break points on the data. These include Barrios et al. (2009), Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012), Caggiano and Greco (2012). Another strand of the literature identifies the regime shift using 
time-varying coefficients models and endogenously determined structural breaks. Such studies include work by 
Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012), Bernoth and Erdogan (2012), Constantini et al. (2014), D’Agostino and 
Ehrmann (2014), Afonso et al. (2015), Paniagua et al. (2016) and Delatte et al. (2017).  
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The second part of our analysis provides evidence that the transition from the second regime 
to the third is determined by factors relating to monetary policy, especially unconventional 
interventions. Specifically, we find that the OMT announcement reduced the responsiveness of 
spreads to their fundamental determinants. Expansions in the ECB balance sheet due to the SMP 
and QE programmes, also had a similar effect. Finally, we show that the impact of monetary 
policy on the relationship between spreads and fundamentals can materialise not only directly 
but also indirectly through reductions in bank credit risk. This is because banking risk affects the 
sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals, but at the same time is highly driven by unconventional 
monetary policy actions.  
Our findings are in line with the predictions of theoretical models of the European debt crisis 
and are intuitively appealing. They suggest that by providing markets with a conditional 
guarantee that it stands ready to act as an LLR, the ECB managed to improve expectations 
causing a shift away from the “bad” equilibrium prevailing during the crisis. The direct effect 
suggests that the OMT and purchases of sovereign bonds in the secondary market reassured 
investors that the ECB stands ready to prevent the collapse of sovereign bond markets due to 
existing fiscal liabilities. The indirect effect hints that the ECB reassured markets that sovereigns 
will not be called upon to finance unsustainable contingent fiscal liabilities originating from 
extensive bank losses. 
 Overall, our work is related to several strands of the literature on the European debt crisis 
and contributes to it in numerous ways. First, it validates the predictions of multiple equilibria 
models of the EMU debt crisis. Second, it presents evidence of a new bond-pricing regime 
following the announcement of OMT, which is different both to the pre-crisis as well as the crisis 
pricing regimes reported in previous literature. Third, it identifies a two-fold channel, direct and 
indirect, via which the ECB has stabilised euro area sovereign bond markets. Our paper’s main 
take-home message is that President Draghi’s speech on 26 July 2012 announcing the 
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introduction of OMT was a game-changer for the resolution of the crisis. The expansion of the 
ECB’s balance sheet provided extra stimulus towards that direction.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 respectively discuss 
our econometric methodology and data. Sections 4 and 5 presents our empirical findings. 
Specifically, section 4 estimates and discusses TVP panel models capturing the changing 
relationship between spreads and fundamentals, while section 5 investigates the factors that 
affect the TVP coefficients. Finally, section 6 summarises and offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. Theoretical background and methodology 
Our empirical analysis is directly linked to the theoretical models of the European debt crisis 
by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) and De Grauwe and Ji (2013). In these models the decision 
of authorities to default and/or exit the eurozone is modelled as a rational choice, determined by 
comparing the costs/benefits of the two policy options. Crucially, the location of the cost/benefit 
function applying to non-default/euro-exit is endogenous to the state of market 
expectations/perceptions regarding the occurrence of such events. In line with the currency-crisis 
literature (see Obstfeld 1986, 1996), shifts in these probabilities result in multiple equilibria, 
where the same level of macro-imbalances results in different sovereign borrowing cost levels. 
This allows for self-fulfilling fiscal defaults and/or euro-exit, caused by exogenous changes in 
the latter’s perceived probabilities. Hence, the models predict a time-varying relationship 
between borrowing costs and fundamentals, determined by the time evolution of the probabilities 
perceived by markets regarding default and/or euro-exits.  
A TVP panel estimation framework modelling spreads on their underlying risk factors is 
well-suited to test this hypothesis. Specifically, in periods of increased (reduced) default/euro-
break up probabilities we should observe relatively high (low) TVP risk-factor coefficients. 
Importantly, the TVP framework captures the effect of shifting default/euro-exit probabilities 
triggered by multiple sources, including spill-over/contagion effects and banking crises (Obstfeld 
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1996); increased noise trading caused by herding behavior (Jeanne and Rose, 2002), and 
sentiment shocks combined with the absence of a LLR (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). These 
contributions predict multiple equilibria due to strategic interaction among market participants, 
allowing for runs on assets not only because investors assess assets to be less valuable 
(fundamentals-based runs), but also because they expect other investors to run on the asset (non-
fundamentals-based runs). The latter raises the possibility of sunspot events (i.e., events that are 
irrelevant for the fundamental valuation of the asset) triggering a market overreaction and 
coordinating investor expectations in a different equilibrium, without a corresponding change in 
the levels of fundamental risk factors.4 In the context of European sovereign bond markets, 
changes in bonds valuations due to multiple equilibria will be reflected in changes in the 
estimated TVP coefficients of the spreads’ underlying risk factors.  
Nevertheless, such changes can also be caused by fundamental-based factors relating to the 
European sovereign bond markets, including the wake-up call hypothesis (Goldstein, 1998; 
Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Bekaert et al., 2014); and changes in the market’s assessment 
regarding future macroeconomic convergence/divergence (Aizenman et al., 2013). It is 
empirically difficult to differentiate shifts in TVP coefficients caused by fundamentals versus 
non-fundamental factors. Having said that, the multiple-equilibria models mentioned above have 
a simple empirical prediction: the price of an asset is more prone to equilibrium indeterminacy 
under conditions of limited market liquidity. This allows us to differentiate the existence of 
multiple-equilibria from other alternative channels affecting spreads’ sensitivity to risk factors 
via two identification strategies:  
The first is time-series evidence relating to the values of the estimated risk-factor TVP 
coefficients for the EMU panel. Discrete major events, such as the announcement of the OMT 
                                                 
4 This is the essence of the difference between first (Krugman, 1979) and second generation (Obstfeld, 1986) models 
of currency crises as well as the closely related literature on self-fulfilling bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) 
and sudden stops on sovereign debt (Calvo, 1988). 
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programme, create a quasi-experimental setting to determine whether changes in the sensitivities 
of spreads to risk factors are due to the processing of new fundamentals-related information (i.e., 
wake-up calls or changes of expectations on future fundamentals) or simply due to the 
amelioration of investors' strategic concerns caused by the absence of an LLR in EMU sovereign 
debt markets. To the extent that the OMT announcement is found to ease the overreaction 
problems in the market, we can infer that market behaviour up to that point could be attributed, 
at least partly, to the self-fulfilling strategic interactions among investors, consistent with the 
multiple-equilibria interpretation of the EMU crisis. 
Second, cross-section evidence distinguishing between EMU and non-EMU panels. If the 
spreads of eurozone countries (for which an LLR was completely absent prior to 2012) are more 
sensitive to risk factors relative to non-euro countries, (whose independent monetary policy 
implies the existence of an LLR throughout the EMU crisis), the implication would be  that 
eurozone countries issuing debt in a common currency are more prone to self-fulfilling dynamics, 
since they cannot control the liquidity of their sovereign bond markets. Combined with the time 
series evidence described above, such a finding would support the multiple-equilibria 
explanation of the EMU crisis relative to alternative fundamentals-based channels.  
Based on the above, we adopt a two-step empirical approach, where the asset’s sensitivity to 
risk factors, identified in the first step, is conditioned upon a set of explanatory variables in the 
second step. Studies employing a similar two-step approach include Manasse and Zavalloni 
(2013), and Bekaert et al. (2014). More specifically, in the first stage of our analysis, we model 
government bond yield spreads against Germany using a TVP panel specification, estimated for 
the euro area, as well as for a panel of European countries not participating to the euro. Given 
Greece’s idiosyncratic characteristics, in the baseline estimates, we present results for the euro 
area panel excluding and including this country.5 Following Li et al. (2011) and Bernoth and 
                                                 
5 Unlike the rest of our sample countries, Greece joined the euro in 2001 rather than 1999. Furthermore, since July 
2015 Greece has in place capital controls, designed to stabilise the Greek banking system following large deposits 
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Erdogan (2012), we estimate the following TVP specification, which forms the baseline model 
of our analysis:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑡 + 𝛼𝜄 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡.      (1) 
 In equation (1),  𝑦𝑖𝑡 denotes 10-year government bond yield spreads, where i = 1…N;  t 
= 1…T; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = [𝑥𝑖𝑡,1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘]′ is a vector of k regressors; and 𝛽𝑡 = [𝛽𝑡,1, … , 𝛽𝑡,𝑘]′ is a vector of k 
time-varying coefficients. In line with previous studies (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Afonso 
et al., 2014), 𝑥𝑖𝑡 includes variables measuring global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk.  
𝛼𝑖 captures country fixed effects and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 a random error term. Fixed effects account for 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific factors that can affect spreads.6 The trend function 
𝑓𝑡 denotes time-specific effects. These control for omitted variables that do not vary across 
countries but evolve over time. The model of Li et al. (2011) is a non-parametric time-varying 
coefficient panel data model based on previous contributions by Robinson (1989) and Cai (2007), 
estimated using the local linear dummy variable (LLDV) approach which improves the rate of 
convergence of ?̂? and outperforms the averaged local linear estimate.  
As in all non-parametric estimates based on a kernel function, the estimation involves the 
choice of a bandwidth parameter (denoted by h*), to which the results are typically sensitive. A 
lower value for h* reduces the bias involved in the TVP estimates but increases their variance. 
We set h* = 0.15 using the cross-validation selection method,7 which is based on the principle 
of selecting the bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared error of the resulting estimates.8 Our 
                                                 
withdraws during the period January – June 2015. In addition, Greece is the only country among our sample 
countries whose sovereign bonds are not part of the QE programme. Finally, as Greece has been the country at the 
epicentre of the EMU sovereign debt crisis, its spreads and fiscal imbalances are a clear outlier, even when compared 
with the figures of other EMU periphery countries (see the descriptive statistics in Table 1).  
6 For identification, it is assumed that  ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 0 (Su and Ullah, 2006) and the fixed effects are eliminated in the 
procedure. 
7 Instead of the conventional leave-one-out cross validation method, we use the leave-one-unit-out approach, which 
is proposed by Sun et al (2009) and it is more adequate for the local linear dummy approach. 
8 An alternative approach, the so-called “rule-of-thumb” method, suggested h* = 0.04. This approach is 
computationally less demanding but can lead to non-robust results, especially when the data series present high 
volatility, as it is the case with our variables. The TVP coefficients that we obtain using h* = 0.04 are broadly 
consistent with those using h* = 0.15, but more volatile. These results are available upon request. An extensive 
survey of bandwidth selection methods can be found in Racine (2008).   
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estimations also account for the “boundary effect” according to which the estimated coefficients 
are biased at the beginning and end of the estimation sample. To address this bias, we follow Dai 
and Sperlich (2010) who propose reducing the bandwidth value at the beginning and end of the 
sample. We do so using a bandwidth correction parameter value, denoted by ε, equal to 0.08, 
satisfying the restriction 0 ˂ ε ˂ h*. Finally, for each estimated TVP coefficient we calculate a 
95% confidence interval by applying the wild bootstrap method on the estimated residuals of the 
non-parametric estimated regression, based on 1000 replications, using the same boundary effect 
correction as in the source regression.  
For the first stage of our analysis, non-linear panel models constitute the main alternative to 
the panel TVP approach we adopt. In their analysis of euro area spreads, Delatte et al. (2017) use 
the panel smooth regression transition (PSRT) model of González et al. (2017).  The PSRT model 
offers some advantages relative to other non-linear approaches, such as threshold panel model 
(TPM) by Hansen (1999) but has its own limitations.9 Compared to these non-linear alternatives, 
the TVP approach has several advantages. First, it allows the identification of multiple regimes. 
Second, it accounts for gradual transition among them. Third, it allows the different regimes to 
be non-recurrent. Fourth, by not imposing any single transition variable, it lets the data to 
determine freely (through observed changes in individual TVP coefficients) the driver(s) of 
transition between different, non-recurring regimes. Fifth, additivity of the individual predicting 
variables is the only assumption regarding the functional form of the model. Finally, the Li et al. 
(2011) TVP approach we follow allows for cross-sectional dependence. Finally, we should stress 
                                                 
9 The TPM approach of Hansen (1999) has two key drawbacks. First, it assumes discrete transition among regimes, 
which may not be suitable for the European debt crisis, where transition between regimes gradual. Second, it allows 
for a maximum of three regimes, when in practice the number of regimes may be higher. On the other hand, the 
PSRT model of González et al. (2017) allows for smooth transition among regimes and, theoretically, a higher 
number of regimes, fluctuating between two extreme regimes.  However, it has some limitations. First, it assumes 
a single, fixed transition variable, when in practice the transition variables may be more than one and/or change over 
time.  Second, the PSRT is subject to technical complications when the series exhibit high volatility (as in our 
dataset), affecting the smoothness of transition among regimes. In that case, the model may face serious problems 
of convergence, implying that in practice it may be difficult to identify more than two regimes. Finally, by 
construction the PSRT, as well as the Hansen (1999) model, assume that the different regimes are recurrent, which 
may not be the case. 
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that the notions of non-linear threshold effects and TVP behavior are related. As Granger (2008, 
p.1) points out, “any non-linear model can be approximated by a time-varying parameter linear 
model”. Hence, ultimately it may be difficult to differentiate between the two possibilities 
regarding the true data generating process.  
In the second stage of our analysis we model each TVP coefficient on an intercept dummy 
variable capturing the effects of the OMT announcement in August 2012, measures of 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy, as well as banking risk. Our econometric 
specification for this part of the analysis is given by equation (2) below: 
𝛽𝑡
?̂? = 𝛾 + 𝑧′𝑡𝛿 + 𝑢𝑡.      (2) 
In equation (2), the dependent variable 𝛽𝑡
?̂?
 is the time-series estimated for the TVP coefficient of 
each of the spreads’ determinants j = (1…k), and 𝑢𝑡 is a random error term. We estimate equation 
(2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and three definitions of  𝑧𝑡.
10 The first includes only the 
OMT dummy. The second extends 𝑧𝑡 to include the proxies for the ECB’s conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy, while the third adds an empirical measure of aggregate credit 
risk for European banks.  
 
3. Data 
 We have obtained data on euro area government bond yield spreads and the underlying 
fundamentals over the period January 1999 to July 2016 (monthly frequency). Our sample 
includes ten EMU member states, covering core (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the 
Netherlands) and periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) economies (for data 
descriptions and sources, see Table A1 in the Appendix).11 
                                                 
10  The variables entering equation (2) are stationary series (see section 5 below).  
11 The distinction between these two groups is common in the literature. See, among others, Afonso et al. (2014), 
Paniagua et al. (2016) and Garcia and Werner (2016).  
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Figure 1 plots 10-year spreads versus Germany, while Panel A of Table 1 presents the 
corresponding descriptive statistics. They highlight the existence of three distinct periods. The 
first covers 1999 to summer 2007 and is characterised by near-zero spread values. The second 
covers summer 2007 to the peak of the crisis in late 2011-early 2012, and involves substantial 
increases in spreads, particularly in Greece but also in other periphery EMU countries. Finally, 
following the OMT announcement, we observe a gradual reduction in spread values to levels 
significantly lower than those in 2012 but higher than the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, 
compared to the latter, mean spread values during the third period present higher variation across 
countries, and are clearly higher in EMU periphery countries. 
[Figure 1] 
We approximate global risk conditions using the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (vix), a variable used by several previous studies (Beber et al., 2009; 
Afonso et al.,2015) to gauge the international risk factor. The vix measures the ‘‘risk-neutral’’ 
expected stock market variance for the US S&P500 contract, computed from a panel of options 
prices, and is well-known as a ‘‘fear index’’ for financial markets (Whaley, 2000; Bekaert and 
Hoerova, 2014). The data is obtained from Bloomberg. An increase in vix is expected to result 
in higher spread values. Developments in global risk involve low pre-crisis values, followed by 
significant increases between 2007 and 2012 and a gradual return towards pre-crisis values 
thereafter (see Figure A1 in the supplementary Appendix).  
BA denotes the 10-year government bond bid-ask spread, sourced from Bloomberg, used to 
measure liquidity effects (Favero et al., 2010; Gerlach et al., 2010).12 A higher value of BA 
indicates a fall in bond market liquidity, and is expected to lead to an increase in government 
bond yield spreads. The almost zero bid-ask spreads between 1999 and 2007 reflect the ample 
                                                 
12 This liquidity proxy captures the trading-cost aspect of liquidity. Alternative measures of financial market 
liquidity, such the difference between on-the-run and off-the-run spreads, turnover, trading volume and the price 
impact ratio, have been considered in previous papers (D’Amico et al., 2010; Florackis et al., 2014). However, these 
measures are not available for the full sample of countries and time-period covered by our analysis.  
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liquidity of the pre-crisis period. A significant deterioration in liquidity conditions ensued, 
associated with the global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis, which affected 
more strongly the periphery group. Since mid-2012, periphery bid-ask spreads declined 
significantly but, on average, still exceed their pre-crisis level.  
Finally, we measure credit risk using two forward-looking variables: First, the logarithm of 
the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), available from Eurostat. The sentiment 
index is a weighted average of five sectoral indexes, whose scores are gathered from surveys 
stating agents’ assessment of the current economic situation and their expectations about future 
developments. As such, the sentiment index is used in the literature as a forward-looking variable 
capturing growth expectations (Monfort and Renne, 2013; Dewachter et al., 2015). Higher esi 
values signal lower credit risk and are therefore expected to result into lower spread levels. 
Second, the one-year ahead expected general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio relative to 
Germany (ED), provided by the European Commission’s Economic Forecasts. The use of 
expected, as opposed to historical fiscal data, is in line with previous studies on the determinants 
of spreads (Attinasi et al., 2009; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). Fiscal conditions are related 
to credit quality, with fiscal deterioration implying higher credit risk. Hence, increased values 
for ED are expected to result in higher spread levels.  
Both measures of credit risk indicate significant increases during the crisis period (see Panels 
C and D of Table 1). Unlike vix and ba, however, credit risk variables do not signal improvements 
following the summer of 2012. By contrast, economic sentiment relative to Germany deteriorates 
further in all core countries and Italy, while the improvement observed in the cases of Greece, 
Portugal and Spain falls short of restoring the average pre-crisis relative esi levels. Moreover, 
except from Finland and the Netherlands, average expected debt values relative to Germany 
increase further since summer 2012. All in all, the summary statistics reported in Table 1 suggest 
that the substantial reductions in spreads observed since the OMT announcement do not coincide 
with a similar improvement in national macro/fiscal fundamentals. This is a prima-facie evidence 
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supporting the multiple equilibria theoretical models of the European sovereign debt crisis 
discussed in the introduction. 
Moving on to the second moment of the risk factors, the picture that emerges is mixed and 
does not always indicate higher volatility during the crisis period.13 The correlation matrix of the 
risk factors is shown in Table 2. The correlations are small and do not support the presence of 
significant endogeneity. The strongest correlations are those between BA and the two forward-
looking proxies of credit risk, i.e. esi and ED. The correlation of BA with esi displays the largest 
magnitude for all three panels.  
[Tables 1 and 2] 
For the second part of our econometric analysis, i.e. the modelling of the spread’s time-
varying responses to the factors described above, we require measures of conventional and 
unconventional monetary policy, as well as banking risk. Conventional monetary policy is 
approximated using the change in the main policy rate of the ECB, namely the main refinancing 
operations rate (ΔMRO). Unconventional monetary policy is captured by the growth (logarithmic 
difference) in the amount of securities held by the ECB for monetary policy purposes (Δshmp), 
as reported in the ECB’s weekly financial statements. The ECB’s securities holdings, data for 
which is available since July 2009 only, have also been used by Gibson et al. (2016) and Delatte 
et al. (2017), among others, to capture the effect of non-standard monetary measures adopted by 
the ECB during the crisis. To construct a monthly series for securities holdings, we use the 
relevant figure quoted in each month’s last weekly consolidated financial statement of the 
Eurosystem, published by the ECB (assets side, item 7.1). The resulting series is presented in 
Figure 2 and depicts the significant expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet effected in the context 
                                                 
13 Given the large shifts in the mean values of our series, the relative standard deviation (absolute value of the 
coefficient of variation) is more appropriate to examine the variability of the subsamples in Table 1. Comparing the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods, there are cases of higher relative volatility (6/10 sample countries for BA; 9/10 for esi) 
but also cases of lower relative volatility during the crisis (7/10 sample countries for ED). Moreover, Figure 1 in the 
supplementary Appendix indicates that vix variability is not exclusively a crisis phenomenon. Overall, the risk 
factors display sufficient variation during the pre-crisis period. 
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of the SMP and, much more so, the QE programme. At the same time, Figure 2 shows the gradual 
relaxation of the ECB’s conventional monetary policy stance, captured by the reduction in the 
MRO towards zero since the end of 2011. Both the change in the MRO and the growth of the 
ECB’s securities holdings are included at lagged form (1-month lag) when estimating equation 
(2). 
[Figure 2] 
We also use an intercept dummy variable to reflect the effect of the OMT announcement on 
the relationship between spreads and fundamentals. The dummy variable (DOMT) is equal to 1 
since August 2012 and 0 otherwise. Finally, we capture banking sector risk in the euro area using 
two banking CDS indices published by Markit. The indexes respectively cover 25 senior and 
junior subordination European banks. The use of CDS data to measure bank credit risk is 
consistent with several previous studies (Acharya et al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; 
Drechsler et al., 2016). The relevant data is presented in Figure 3. It confirms the strong 
correlation between banking and sovereign risk, as both measures of banking risk mirror the 
movements of spreads reported in Figure 1.14 Specifically, both CDS indexes are close to zero 
before the financial crisis; increase since summer 2007, reaching a maximum at the end of 2011; 
and decline, albeit to a level higher than their pre-crisis mean, since summer 2012. In baseline 
estimates of equation (2), we use the lagged CDS senior index, while in robustness checks we 
employ the CDS subordinate index.  
[Figure 3] 
 
 
                                                 
14 Bank credit risk is not included as explanatory variable in the model for spreads since, given the high correlation 
between sovereign risk and banking risk and the existing literature on the sovereign-bank nexus, reverse feedback 
from the former (our dependent variable) to the latter cannot be ruled out. As De Grauwe and Ji (2013, p.23) point 
out, “In the existing empirical literature there has been a tendency to add a lot of other variables on the right-hand 
side…In fact, the addition of these variables creates a risk of false claims that the fundamental model explains the 
spreads well”.    
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4. TVP estimates and bond pricing regimes  
4.1. Empirical findings  
The TVP estimates of equation (1) for the full panel of core and periphery EMU sample 
countries, excluding Greece, are reported in Figure 4. The figure provides clear evidence for the 
existence of three pricing regimes in euro area sovereign bond markets. The first covers the 
period from the euro’s launch in 1999 to approximately mid-2007. During this period, the 
estimated TVP coefficients of all risk sources (global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk) 
are zero or near-zero. The sole exception is the expected gross government debt-to-GDP ratio 
relative to Germany, whose coefficient has a small but statistically significant positive value 
throughout most of the pre-crisis period. Figures 5 and 6 present TVP estimates for the core and 
periphery country groups, respectively, again excluding Greece in the case of the latter. They 
show that the first pricing regime applied both to core and periphery EMU countries, although 
the role of expected debt in determining spreads is noticeably more pronounced in the periphery, 
signalling higher penalties on fiscal imbalances for this group of countries. On the other hand, 
core countries present higher statistical significance for the coefficient of expected growth.  
[Figure 4] 
The second pricing regime approximately extends between mid-2007 and mid-2012 and 
involves a rapid increase both in the absolute value as well as statistical significance of the 
coefficients of all risk factors.15 Again, this trend is common both for core as well as periphery 
countries. However, the absolute values of the estimated TVP coefficients are, overall, noticeably 
                                                 
15 Note that for a very small number of observations in this regime, as well as in the third pricing regime discussed 
below, the point estimates of the estimated TVP coefficients fall outside the confidence interval (CI) calculated 
using the wild bootstrap methodology. These can be regarded as outliers produced by the bootstrapping exercise, 
with no impact on the reliability of our results: the standard calculation of a CI involves use of a parameter’s point 
estimate as the central point of the CI estimation and calculation of the CI around the point estimate. This ensures 
that the point estimate always falls within the estimated CI bounds. Bootstrap methods, on the other hand, follow a 
different CI estimation approach, involving multiple estimates of the parameter in question (in our case 1000, one 
per bootstrap iteration) and the empirical setting of an upper and lower CI bound within which 95 per cent (or any 
other predetermined proportion) of these estimates fall. In this methodology of CI construction, it is possible for a 
parameter’s point estimate to fall outside the empirically constructed CI. Indeed, for a 95 per cent CI calculated 
using our bootstrapping methodology, the a priori expectation is that the point estimate will fall outside the 
calculated CI in 5 per cent of observations.   
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higher for the group of periphery countries, capturing the larger risk exposure of the periphery. 
The signs of the estimated TVP coefficients are in line with the theoretical expectations. The 
only exception is expected relative sovereign debt in core countries for which we obtain a 
negative sign. This finding indicates the presence of misspecification, however it persists in all 
robustness tests presented in section 4.2.2 below undertaken to address this possibility. 
Therefore, variants of debt to GDP ratio, commonly used to capture national credit risk may, in 
certain cases, be missing something important for the determination of sovereign debt risk. This 
is an important remark motivating future research on this subject. Nevertheless, we note that for 
the vast majority of observations the negative debt TVP coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
[Figures 5 and 6] 
Finally, we provide evidence for a third pricing regime, covering the period between 
approximately mid-2012 to the end of our sample. This period is characterised by a reduction in 
the absolute values and/or statistical insignificance of the estimated TVP coefficients. As far as 
the international risk factor is concerned, its coefficient maintains a positive, albeit declining, 
value until approximately mid-2014. This, however, is statistically significant only for the core 
panel. Thereafter, the vix coefficient takes near-zero and insignificant values in all three panels. 
Liquidity risk also presents a positive yet declining TVP coefficient during the third regime. This 
is statistically significant until mid-2014 for the full and periphery panels and until the end of 
2013 for the core panel (see Figures 5 and 6).  Thereafter, the coefficient of BA takes a zero and 
insignificant value in core countries. On the other hand, starting from early 2015 the BA 
coefficient registers a significant increase for the periphery panel. This is another unexpected 
finding, which, however, does not persist in the robustness checks in section 4.2. 
Expected relative growth maintains a negative and significant coefficient well into the third 
regime, albeit with a declining absolute value. For the full panel, statistical significance is 
maintained until the end of 2014; for core countries until summer 2013 and for periphery 
countries until summer 2015. By the end of our sample, esi takes near-zero and insignificant 
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values in all three panels. Finally, the TVP coefficient of expected relative debt ratio registers a 
sharp decline in mid-2012 in the full panel, becoming statistically insignificant in mid-2013. 
However, starting from early 2014 the ED coefficient resumes an upwards movement. This falls 
short of being statistically significant at the 95% level, although it is close to being so. The 
movements of the ED coefficient in the full panel are mainly driven by the periphery group, 
although the increase towards the end of our sample is also recorded for core countries. 
We end our discussion in this section with a reference to the possibility that our TVP findings 
capture a non-linear, time-invariant relationship between spreads and risk factors, rather than 
regime changes reflected into a time-varying relationship (see section 2 above). To that end, we 
plot the average value of each risk factor along with the estimated time-varying parameters. The 
results are reported in Figure A2 in the supplementary Appendix. The average values of esi and 
BA shift significantly during the crisis period and, at the same time, the sensitivity of spreads to 
these risk factors changes, hinting towards the possibility of nonlinear threshold effects. 
However, in the case of vix, high pre-crisis values are not associated with higher TVP 
coefficients. Indeed, the vix coefficient is activated at a record low vix levels. The same holds 
true for the ED coefficient which starts rising at relatively low values, and later displays a 
significant drop, even though average ED continues to rise towards record levels. The 
movements of the vix and ED TVP coefficients are clearly not consistent with non-linear 
threshold effect. All in all, the evidence reported in Figure A2 indicates a combination of non-
linear threshold behavior and shifts from between non-recurrent pricing regimes, both of which, 
according to Granger (2008), can be captured by our TVP methodology.  
 
4.2. Robustness tests  
We tested the robustness of the findings reported in section 4.1 in numerous ways, all of 
which confirm their validity. The first group of robustness tests maintains the same baseline 
specification in terms of the risk factors on which spreads are modelled, differentiating on the 
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sample of included countries, the timing of the right hand-side terms and the values of the 
bandwidth and correction parameters. The second group expands/modifies the set of risk factors. 
With one exception (the case of including Greece), to economize space we only report findings 
relating to the full panel. The results relating to the core and periphery countries are consistent 
with those reported above and are available upon request. 
 
4.2.1. Baseline specification tests  
Including Greece  
First, we added Greece into the analysis. The results are reported in Figures 7 (full panel) and 
8 (periphery panel). Our findings remain broadly robust, although the inclusion of Greece 
increases the absolute values of the TVP estimates in both panels, as well as the bounds of their 
95% confidence intervals towards the end of the sample period. The latter is consistent with the 
highly idiosyncratic circumstances faced by Greece in 2015-2016, including a major 
confrontation with its official lenders in the first half of 2015, which brought Greece very near 
to withdrawing from the EMU and led to the imposition of (still in place) capital controls; and 
the exclusion of Greek bonds from the ECB’s QE programme announced in January 2015. 
Moreover, including Greece, the puzzling finding reported in Figure 6 regarding the increase in 
the liquidity coefficient of the periphery panel since 2015 disappears. 
[Figures 7 and 8] 
First lag of regressors  
Second, to address any endogeneity concerns, we repeated the estimation of equation (1) 
using the first lag rather than the contemporaneous values of the independent variables. The 
results are consistent with the findings reported in section 4.1 above (see Figure A3 in the 
supplementary material Appendix).  
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Alternative bandwidth and correction parameters  
Third, we have tested the robustness of our findings to changes in the value of the bandwidth 
estimation parameter h. Specifically, we estimated equation (1) using three alternative h-values, 
namely 0.10, 0.20 and 0.30, to assess the tradeoff between the bias of the TVP estimates and 
their variance. The results are consistent with those obtained by our benchmark model, where h 
is set equal to 0.15 (see Figure A4 in the supplementary Appendix). Fourth, we have tested the 
robustness of our findings to alternative values of the bandwidth correction parameter ε. Again, 
the results are consistent with those obtained from the benchmark model, which sets ε = 0.08 
(see Figure A5 in the supplementary Appendix).  
 
Orthogonalized bid-ask spread  
Since BA exhibits the strongest comovement with the other risk factors (see Table 2), in this 
robustness check we orthogonalize BA to remove its systematic comovement with the other risk 
factors (Bekaert et al., 2009). Specifically, we estimate a fixed effects panel regression of BA on 
vix, esi and ED, and collect the residuals. These correspond to the orthogonalized version of BA 
capturing more appropriately the idiosyncratic variation in BA. Figure 9 shows the full panel 
TVP results which, overall, are similar to those obtained by the baseline model. The results 
remain unchanged for the core and periphery panels too (see Figures A6 and A7 in the 
supplementary Appendix, respectively). One notable difference, however, is that the puzzling 
finding of the increasing TVP liquidity coefficient for the full and periphery panels at the end of 
the sample disappears. These findings imply that the orthogonalized BA series is a better measure 
of liquidity risk /or the unorthogonalised BA series captures an unobserved risk factor for the last 
part of our sample. 
 [Figure 9] 
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Actual debt-to-GDP ratio 
To account for the possibility of measurement errors in the expected debt-to-GDP ratio, we 
replace it with the actual values of the debt-to-GDP ratio (data sourced from Eurostat). The 
results for the full panel are reported in Figure A8 of the supplementary Appendix. These are 
similar with those from the baseline specification.  
 
4.2.2. Expanding the set of risk factors  
Decomposing VIX  
It is well-known that VIX reflects both stock market uncertainty and a volatility risk premium 
(Bollerslev et al., 2009; Bekaert and Hoerova, 2014; Stillwagon, 2017). The volatility premium 
has been shown to be a good predictor of stock returns (Bollerslev et al., 2009; Bekaert and 
Hoerova, 2014), while Stillwagon (2017) has used it the modelling of TIPS bonds. Motivated by 
this literature, we decompose the VIX in its two components: More specifically, following 
Bollerslev et al. (2009) we define the volatility premium as the difference between the squared 
VIX in monthly percentages (i.e. VIX2/12) and realized volatility.16 The volatility premium 
reflects the wedge between the “model-free” risk-neutral expected volatility (or implied 
volatility) over the [t, t+1] time interval and actual (or physical) stock market volatility, measured 
over the [t-1, t] time interval. The volatility premium serves as a proxy for the aggregate degree 
of risk aversion.17  
The results in Figure 10 indicate that the effect of both components of the VIX, realized 
volatility and volatility premium, are statistically significant during the crisis period.  Hence, 
both time-varying volatility risk and time-varying risk aversion appear to play a significant role 
in explaining variation in spreads. Nevertheless, compared to the VIX index, the effect of its 
                                                 
16 The dataset is obtained from the website of H. Zhou (https://sites.google.com/site/haozhouspersonalhomepage/). 
17 The advantage of this approach is that both implied volatility and realized volatility, and therefore the volatility 
premium, are directly observable at time t. An alternative would entail obtaining a forecast of expected realized 
volatility and calculating the expected variance premium. As Bollerslev et al. (2009) point out, the two premia would 
coincide under the assumption that realized volatility is a martingale difference sequence. 
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individual constituent components appears to be more short-lived in terms of statistical 
significance. Finally, compared to the benchmark model the decomposition of the VIX did not 
affect the TVP coefficients of the remaining risk factors. 
 [Figure 10] 
Adding real effective exchange rate  
Motivated by the multiple equilibria theoretical model of the European debt crisis by 
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) and previous empirical analyses by Arghyrou and Kontonikas 
(2012) and Afonso et al. (2014), among others, we extend the set of risk factors to include the 
logarithm of the real effective exchange rate (reer).  This variable is a proxy of denomination 
risk, arising from real exchange rate overvaluation. If the multiple equilibria narrative of the 
European deb crisis is correct, we would expect to obtain time variation for the reer coefficient.  
[Figure 11] 
As we can see in Figure 11, including reer in the empirical model for spreads does not affect 
the TVP coefficients of the remaining risk factors. Crucially, the TVP coefficient of reer 
fluctuates in size and statistical significance over time. During the pre-crisis period, it takes near-
zero values and is insignificant. This indicates no perception of redenomination risk during the 
early EMU years. The onset of the global financial crisis in summer 2007 is associated with a 
gradual increase in the reer coefficient’s size and statistical significance, reaching a peak in 
summer 2010, indicating transition to a new regime characterized by the pricing of 
redenomination risk. This is additional to increased fiscal default risk, as the latter is captured by 
the simultaneous increase in the coefficient of ED during the crisis period. In the wake of the 
first Greek bail-out and the introduction of the SMP, the reer coefficient’s size and significance 
starts declining and gradually becomes insignificant. Finally, it becomes significant again 
between mid-2014 and end-2015. Summarising, our evidence is consistent with the predictions 
of the theoretical model of Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011), which differentiates explicitly 
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between fiscal default and redenomination risk.  In section 4.3 below we further analyse the issue 
of redenomination risk from alternative perspectives. 
 
4.3. Discussion 
Overall, our TVP analysis confirms the existence of the pre-crisis and crisis bond-pricing 
regimes identified by previous studies on the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in 
the euro area. In addition to these regimes, however, we find evidence of a third regime 
introduced in the second part of 2012. Apart from the studies by Saka et al. (2015) and Delatte 
et al. (2017), the previous literature on regime-dependent sovereign bond pricing has not 
analysed the implications of the OMT announcement and more generally the role of ECB policy 
interventions. The latter study concludes that the change in the regime following the 
announcement represents a restoration of the regime that was in place prior to the crisis. This 
inference, however, is not consistent with the movements of spreads since August 2012, which 
by comparison to the pre-crisis regime are on average higher; and have stabilized at levels 
noticeably higher, and more variable across countries, (see Figure 1 and Panel A of Table 1). 
These stylized facts imply that the third regime is not identical to the pre-crisis regime, but a 
new, distinct regime, where markets are pricing sources of risk that were: (a) either less penalized 
by markets, or (b) not priced at all during the pre-crisis period.18 
With regards to the former argument, our analysis above confirmed that during a substantial 
part of the third regime, markets continued to price fundamentals in way that was less 
pronounced compared to the second regime but more pronounced compared to the first. 
                                                 
18 Saka et al. (2015) find that the explanatory power of macro /fiscal fundamentals, captured by the adjusted R2 of 
regressions modelling CDS spreads, is stronger in the post-OMT window. They interpret this as evidence for the 
ECB’s role in combating sentiment-driven self-fulling dynamics, helping euro area bond markets to co-ordinate on 
a more fundamental-based equilibrium.  Their finding can be reconciled with our finding that the sensitivity of 
spreads to the risk factors declines during the third regime. The latter reflects lower perceived default/euro-exit 
probabilities and improving market sentiment, resulting into stabilization of bonds prices and lower spread’s 
volatility (see Panel A in Table 1). Both sets of findings are consistent with the theoretical models discussed in 
section 2, which predict that improvements in market sentiment lowers spread’s levels and volatility, increasing the 
predictive power of macro/fiscal fundamentals in spreads’ determination.  
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Furthermore, liquidity risk in periphery countries continues to be priced at the end of our sample 
and the same may hold for expected relative debt ratios, whose TVP coefficient is close to being 
significant at the 5% level for the full panel. As far as the latter argument is concerned, valuable 
insights are provided by the time effects in equation (1).  Time effects capture the net impact of 
country-invariant factors that may increase or decrease spreads over time beyond the level 
predicted by the model’s explanatory variables. Hence, if non-zero, they will signal the 
importance of factors other than global financial risk, liquidity risk and credit risk.  
The time effects for the core and periphery panels are presented in Figure 12. In both panels, 
during the pre-crisis regime time effects were near zero. Time effects become much more 
important during the crisis period. Between summer 2007 and late 2011, they take increasingly 
negative values.19 This implies that over that period, spreads would have been even higher in the 
absence of mitigating factors pushing spreads below fundamentals-consistent values.20 Such 
factors include the provision of programmes of financial assistance to those countries mostly 
affected by the crisis (Greece, Portugal and Ireland), and the introduction of institutional 
innovations such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), whose primary target was 
to set in place a previously non-existing fiscal back-stop at the union level.21 
                                                 
19 The difference between our results and those of De Grauwe and Ji (2013) regarding the sign of the time effects 
during the pre-OMT period may be attributed to the different empirical frameworks utilized. De Grauwe and Ji 
(2013) use fixed parameter specifications to test the multiple-equilibria theory of the European debt crisis. They 
argue that their positive time effects during the crisis capture movements in spreads caused by negative sentiment 
shifts, which provides the link with the multiple equilibria narrative of the crisis. By contrast, we use a TVP 
specification with time effects, which as explained in section 2, provides a more suitable framework to test the 
underlying theory. Our findings agree with De Grauwe and Ji’s (2013) conclusions regarding the shift to a “bad” 
equilibrium during the crisis, therefore the two sets of findings are consistent. However, as we capture regime shifts 
through the movements of the model’s TVP individual coefficients, our empirical framework corresponds better to 
the underlying theoretical models and is more informative regarding the drivers of regime changes.   
20 For core countries, the maximum difference is estimated in the range of 120 basis points, observed in early 2012. 
In the periphery panel excluding Greece, the maximum difference (approximately 150 basis points) is recorded in 
early 2009 and early 2012. When Greece is included in the periphery panel, the difference records its maximum 
level between late 2011 and the first half 2012, taking values ranging between 600 and 700 basis points. 
21 While financial support programmes occurred at the country-level, it is possible that they reduced the upward 
pressure on spreads of other countries through “benign” spillover effects. See Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012), De 
Santis (2014), Saka et al. (2015) and Ehrmann and Fratzcher (2017) among others, for analyses of spillover effects 
in the context of the European debt crisis. It can also be argued that bailouts and the creation of the EFSF improved 
market sentiment (or helped to avoid further deterioration) and reduced overall uncertainty, since they demonstrated 
the willingness of policymakers to fight the crisis. The idea that time effects may capture market sentiment is 
consistent with De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Gibson et al. (2016). 
25 
 
[Figure 12] 
These mitigating influences started to disappear in early 2012, especially in periphery 
countries, as suggested by the sharply increasing time effects in Figure 12. Greece, Italy and 
Spain recorded significant spread increases in spring 2012. These tensions may reflect a negative 
view by market participants about the adequacy of measures taken up to that point to fully and 
successfully resolve the crisis. Crucially, the EMU had not set in place a mechanism endowed 
with enough resources to fund rescue programmes in case they were needed to stabilize notably 
the Italian and Spanish bond markets and banking systems. With Italian and Spanish spreads 
already in the range of 500 basis points, this dynamic, if left unchecked, could result into a 
collapse of Italian and Spanish bond markets, representing an imminent threat to the existence 
of the euro.22  
It is precisely this threat the ECB sought to address by announcing the OMT programme.23 
The OMT allows the ECB to intervene in secondary sovereign bond markets, provided that the 
country requesting its activation agrees a programme of economic adjustment or a precautionary 
Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Therefore, by involving conditionality, the OMT cannot be interpreted as a blanket monetary 
guarantee of fiscal liabilities; and by introducing it the ECB has not assumed the role of lender 
of last resort (LLR) in the classic sense, as under the latter the central bank can unilaterally 
intervene in secondary bond markets without reference to any external prerequisites. If the ECB 
had provided a blanket guarantee, spreads would have completely stopped responding to 
                                                 
22 As Di Cesare et al. (2012) point out, concerns about a possible break-up of the euro area became widespread by 
late spring/early summer 2012. The volume of Google searches of “euro break-up” or similar keywords using 
peaked, while a survey of central bank reserve managers by the UBS bank revealed that about three quarters of them 
expected at least one country to leave the euro area within five years. Finally, the Sentix index discussed below, 
suggests a high perceived euro-break probability just before and after the announcement of OMT.  
23 ECB officials have publicly stated that one of the targets of the unconventional policy interventions was to reduce 
redenomination risk (Krishnamurthy et al., 2015). Apart from President Draghi’s “whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro” speech of 26 July 2012, other examples include the speech by ECB Executive Board Member Benoît Cœuré 
on 3 September 2013 (http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130902.en.html), where he discussed 
redenomination risk in the context of the OMT.     
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country-specific credit risk factors; and the relationship between spreads and risk factors would 
be similar to the first regime.  
Having said that, average spread values in the third regime are significantly lower than in 
the second. According to our findings, this is the result of a substantial reduction in their 
responsiveness to the underlying risk factors triggered by the OMT’s announcement. As 
mentioned in section 2 above, the time-series evolution of the risk-factor TVP coefficients 
following the introduction of OMT suggests that the mere announcement of conditional liquidity 
provision by the ECB eased the strategic concerns of investors in the absence of an LLR in the 
EMU sovereign bond markets. This implies that OMT triggered a regime shift in European 
sovereign bonds prices, because Mr. Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes” speech succeeded in 
lowering substantially (though not eliminating) the perceived probability of sovereign defaults 
and/or exits from the euro area.  
Further evidence in favour of this conclusion is obtained by estimating our benchmark TVP 
model for a control group of non-EMU countries, including Denmark, Sweden and the UK. 
These are all European Union countries with independent monetary policies, whose national 
central banks can undertake the role of LLR in the event of a sovereign debt crisis. This provides 
investors a guarantee that the sovereign bonds of these countries face limited default risk 
compared to individual EMU countries with no control over the single monetary policy, implying 
no ability to inject liquidity in their sovereign bond markets during a crisis (De Grauwe and Ji, 
2013; Saka et al., 2015). The reduced default probability should be reflected in smaller and less 
time-variant TVP risk factor coefficients. The corollary of potential monetary financing of fiscal 
liabilities is the existence of inflation and exchange rate risk, the combination of which can be 
captured by the movements of the real exchange rate. Therefore, when estimating the benchmark 
model for the non-EMU panel we add reer as an extra risk variable.  
The results are presented in Figure 13. Consistent with the LLR stabilization effect, our the 
TVP estimates for the majority of risk factors (vix, BA and esi) are statistically insignificant. The 
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only risk factors that are significant for relatively short periods of time, mainly during the pre-
crisis period, are the expected debt to GDP ratio differential against Germany and real effective 
exchange rate risk.24  We have tested the robustness of these findings by extending the non-EMU 
panel to include two European countries that are not part of the European Union, namely 
Switzerland and Norway. Our inference remains unchanged, as the majority of the TVP 
coefficients remain statistically insignificant in explaining spreads; indeed, incidences of 
significance are further restricted compared to the findings reported in Figure 13 (see Figures A9 
and A10 in the supplementary Appendix, respectively, adding Switzerland and then Norway to 
the panel).25  
Overall, the combination of the two sets of findings discussed above, respectively referring 
to EMU and non-EMU countries, support the multiple equilibria view of the eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis vis-à-vis alternative fundamentals-based explanations of the evolution of the crisis. 
By undertaking the LLR role (even under conditionality), the ECB introduced a new bonds’ 
pricing regime, abolishing the “bad” equilibrium of the crisis period with one involving lower 
spread values.26 
                                                 
24 Specifically, ED is positive and significant during the period mid-2001 and mid-2005; and then again for the 
relatively short period covering November 2011 to December 2013. These are periods during which the value of 
expected debt to GDP ratio against Germany increased for the majority of observations in the panel. The increase 
observed in the TVP coefficient of ED is consistent with the argument by Obstfeld (1996) according to which 
increased public debt can be a source of more aggressive pricing of fundamentals. On the other hand, reer is priced 
with the expected positive sign between mid-2003 and mid-2009, which covers a large part of the pre-crisis period 
as well as the period of the global financial crisis. However, reer is not priced during the European debt crisis. 
25 When the non-EMU panel is extended to include Switzerland, the significance of the debt to GDP differential 
against Germany is restricted to the period November 2011 to August 2013; while the real effective exchange rate 
is significant only between February 2007 and May 2009 (see Figure A9 in the supplementary Appendix). Adding 
Norway as a fifth panel member fully eliminates the statistical significance of the debt to GDP differential against 
Germany, leaving the real effective exchange rate as the sole statistically significant determinant of spreads, for the 
period April 2006 to April 2009 only (see Figure A10 in the supplementary Appendix). Note that the European 
Commission data sets for Economic Sentiment Indicator and debt forecasts do not include Norway and Switzerland. 
As a result, the TVP models underlying Figures A9 and A10 have been estimated using, for all five countries 
involved in the estimations, the Business Confidence Indicator published by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the quarterly actual debt series published by the Bank of International 
Settlements.  
26 Our findings are consistent with those by Saka et al. (2015) who find increased commonality in the movements 
of spreads post-OMT in euro area, as they imply a gradual phasing-out of negative market sentiment and country-
specific redenomination risk. This results into a more homogenous, and more favourable bonds pricing model, 
replacing the “bad equilibrium” pricing model of the crisis period.  
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[Figure 13] 
 Nevertheless, the reduction in spreads triggered by the OMT announcement did not happen 
immediately. Although spreads entered a downward path immediately after the OMT 
announcement, Figure 12 suggests that time effects in the periphery panel kept on rising until 
mid-2013. Thereafter, they declined only gradually. We interpret this as evidence of residual 
redenomination risk carried over from the crisis period. This interpretation is consistent with De 
Santis (2015) who finds that following the OMT announcement redenomination risk declined 
but remained at positive levels.  
In addition, the time effects of the periphery panel including Greece provide further evidence 
in favour of the redenomination risk interpretation. Unlike time effects excluding Greece, the 
series depicts an upward movement since mid-2014, reaching a maximum in June 2015, at the 
peak of Greece’s confrontation with its official lenders. Thereafter, the series stabilizes but at 
significantly positive values.27 As the possibility of Greece exiting the EMU increased in 2015, 
the argument that the time effects reported for the post-OMT period mainly capture 
redenomination risk gains further credibility. This is an important differentiating factor between 
the first (pre-crisis) and third (post-OMT) pricing regimes. Redenomination risk did not exist in 
the former but existed for the best part of the latter. This helps to explain the difference in average 
spread values observed between the two regimes.  
Further evidence in support of residual redenomination risk is provided by the Sentix euro-
break up index, depicted in Figure 14. Sentix is being published since June 2012 and measures 
the proportion of surveyed investors (private and institutional) predicting at least one country 
leaving the euro area within the next twelve months. The June, July and August 2012 Sentix’s 
values reveal that, just before and after the announcement of the OMT programme, markets 
perceived very significant redenomination risk, with 55%, 73% and 62% of the surveyed 
                                                 
27 Overall, Figure 12 provides strong evidence to support Greece’s significant idiosyncratic features relative to the 
rest of the periphery countries, justifying our choice to exclude it from our baseline periphery panel.  
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investors, respectively. This percentage gradually declined but remained positive, maintaining 
mainly double-digit values, throughout the period August 2012 – August 2014. Sentix resumed 
an increasing trend, returning to values close to 50%, between September 2014 and June 2015, 
a period coinciding with the escalating confrontation between Greece and its EMU partners. 
Finally, following agreement on the third Greek financial adjustment programme in July 2015, 
Sentix gradually returned to lower values, close to 10%. Overall, the movements of Sentix are 
similar to those of the time effects presented in Figure 12, especially when including Greece into 
the analysis, supporting our argument that the time effects capture declining but non-zero 
redenomination risk during the third regime.28    
[Figure 14] 
5. ECB policy, banking risk and bond pricing regimes 
5.1. Empirical findings  
In this section we investigate the link between monetary policy, banking risk and bond 
pricing regimes. We start by modelling the point estimates of the TVP coefficients obtained in 
the first stage of our analysis on an intercept dummy variable capturing the effect of the OMT 
announcement, as well as ECB policy measures and bank credit risk.29 The sample period for 
this analysis is August 2009 – July 2016, covering the third and second (partially) bond pricing 
regimes identified in the first stage, and is dictated by non-availability of data on the ECB’s 
securities holdings prior to July 2009. Table 3 presents OLS estimates of equation (2) with 
                                                 
28 The TVP reer coefficients reported in Figure 11 are broadly consistent with the inference obtained from the time 
effects estimated for our benchmark model: Both indicate lack of redenomination risk during the pre-crisis period 
and non-zero redenomination risk during the post-OMT period. However, for the first part of 2012, the reer 
coefficients reported in Figure 11 are not significant, whereas the estimated time effects reported in Figure 12 
indicate increasing redenomination risk, confirmed by the Sentix index values reported in Figure 13. This implies 
that although the movements of the reer coefficient contain significant information regarding the evolution of 
redenomination risk in the euro area, they are not a perfectly accurate measure for the latter.   
29 All the TVP coefficients are stationary according to the Lee and Strazicich (2003) unit root test, which allows for 
structural breaks in the series’ deterministic components. The regressors included in the right-hand side of equation 
(2) are also stationary series. The results of these tests are available upon request.  
30 
 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Panel A refers to the full set of countries, while Panels 
B and C present the results for the core and periphery groups, respectively.30 
[Table 3] 
 The findings in column 1 of Table 3 – Panel A correspond to the specification where only the 
OMT dummy variable is used to explain the TVP coefficients of the full panel group (the dummy 
variable is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise). They show that in most instances the 
OMT effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, or lower, and its sign consistent with lower 
sensitivity of spreads to fundamentals. Evidence for the core and periphery groups in Panels B 
and C, respectively, is also consistent with a weaker response of spreads to the risk factors since 
summer 2012. An exception is the reaction of spreads to liquidity conditions in the periphery 
panel, which becomes stronger, with the point estimate of the TVP coefficient of BA more than 
doubling. The OMT dummy has a positive sign in the case of the core group’s expected relative 
debt, which we interpret as evidence for correction of the unexpected negative sign that occurred 
during the second regime, while consistently depicting a negative sign for the periphery group.  
We then add in equation (2) the lagged growth of securities held by the ECB for monetary 
policy purposes, a proxy for unconventional interventions, and the lagged change in the MRO, a 
measure of conventional monetary policy shifts.31 The results in column 2 of Table 3 show that 
including these variables does not alter the findings pertaining to the OMT effects. The evidence 
highlights the important role of unconventional monetary policy actions since the growth of the 
ECB’s security holdings is statistically significant in many instances. The sign of the estimated 
coefficients indicates that the expansion of the ECB’s security holdings is typically associated 
with lower sensitivity of spreads to liquidity risk and credit risk, when the latter is proxied by 
expected relative growth. This result holds for the full panel, as well as the core and periphery 
                                                 
30 Note that Greece is excluded from both the full panel and the panel of periphery countries. 
31 The motivation for differencing is related to the non-stationarity of the log level of securities held for monetary 
policy purposes. Since we use Δshmp for our estimations, we cannot take an explicit position in the “stock” vs. 
“flow” argument of the central bank balance sheet. There is a nascent debate at policy level on this issue with the 
views being divided (BIS, 2017).  Our results can only provide evidence for the potential importance of flows. 
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groups. On the other hand, the effect of conventional monetary policy actions is statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level in all cases.  
Finally, motivated by the evidence in Delatte et al. (2017) about the importance of bank credit 
risk as a source of time variation in the relationship between spreads and fundamentals, we add 
the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index to the set of explanatory 
variables in equation (2). The results are presented in column 3 of Table 3. They show that bank 
credit risk is an important driver of the TVP coefficients, with the adjusted R2 rising by 25% on 
average, across the various specifications. An increase in bank credit risk is typically associated 
with larger (in absolute magnitude) point estimates, indicating heightened sensitivity of spreads 
to fundamentals, and the effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. The only consistent 
exception to this general rule involves the impact of bank risk on the coefficient of the expected 
relative debt ratio. As far as the other coefficients are concerned, the results in columns 1 and 2, 
which do not account for developments in the banking sector, remain broadly robust to the 
inclusion of the bank credit risk measure in column 3. Similar findings are obtained when the 
European banking sector junior subordination CDS index is used as a proxy for banking risk 
(results available upon request). 
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that ECB interventions and banking risk are both 
important in explaining the time-varying relationship between spreads and fundamentals 
between 2009 and 2016. However, it is plausible that bank credit risk is itself affected by ECB 
policy interventions. This implies that an indirect effect of policy interventions on the sensitivity 
of spreads to fundamentals, working through changes in banking risk, can co-exist with a direct 
one. In fact, Chodorow-Reich (2014) uses a high-frequency event study and shows that during 
2008-2009 banking risk in the U.S. declined following unconventional monetary policy 
announcements. Fratzscher et al. (2014) take a similar approach, producing consistent findings, 
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when analysing the impact of ECB policy announcements in the period 2007-2012.32 Hence, we 
proceed by modelling our empirical measures of bank credit risk on the OMT announcement 
dummy, the two variables that capture conventional and unconventional monetary policy 
developments and several control variables. The set of controls includes the first lag of vix, 
growth expectations, and bank credit risk.  
The results in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 4 show the OMT effect is negative and statistically 
significant, capturing a decline in bank credit risk associated with the OMT announcement. This 
finding is consistent with the results of Fratzscher et al. (2014). The lagged growth of ECB 
security holdings is strongly significant too. It displays a negative coefficient, indicating that 
unconventional monetary policy interventions led to lower banking risk. These effects are more 
pronounced in the equations modelling the subordinate CDS. The impact of lagged MRO 
changes on bank credit risk, however, is statistically insignificant. Thus, our evidence stresses 
the significance of unconventional monetary policy as a determinant of aggregate euro area 
banking risk.  
ECB policies, however, may affect banking risk not only directly, but also indirectly, through 
changes in sovereign spreads. As Acharya et al. (2017) explain, the decrease in the spreads (and 
corresponding increase in the value) of periphery sovereign bonds caused by the announcement 
of OMT resulted into substantial windfall gains and an indirect recapitalization of European 
banks with significant holdings of such bonds. To account for this indirect effect, we expand our 
empirical specification modelling banking risk by incorporating the lagged first principal 
component of euro area spreads, calculated using the full set of countries. In line with Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012) and Saka et al. (2015), among others, we interpret the first principal 
component of spreads, depicted in Figure A11 in the supplementary Appendix, as a euro area 
                                                 
32 Delatte et al. (2017) interpret the gradual reversion to the non-crisis regime since summer 2012, suggested by 
their estimates, in the light of the OMT announcement by arguing that the ECB was successful in taming aggregate 
banking risk and severing the sovereign-bank nexus. Nevertheless, they do not formally test these conjectures. 
33 
 
sovereign risk factor. The estimates of the extended model are shown in column 4 of Table 4. 
The OMT dummy and the lagged growth in security holdings remain important determinants of 
banking risk, thereby supporting the existence of a direct effect of OMT on banking risk.  At the 
same time, however, the lagged sovereign risk factor is also highly significant with a positive 
sign. This indicates that a reduction in sovereign risk, which occurred in the post-OMT period, 
results into lower banking risk. Overall, our findings suggest that ECB policies have both direct 
and indirect effects on banking risk. 
[Table 4] 
Summarising, this section presents strong evidence that the announcement of the OMT 
programme influenced the mechanism linking spreads to global financial risk, liquidity risk and 
credit risk. The expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet provided extra stimulus and further 
weakened the link between spreads and fundamentals. Importantly, the impact of policy 
interventions on the risk factors’ sensitivities is both direct and indirect, the latter materialising 
through reductions in bank credit risk. The direct effect suggests that the OMT and purchases of 
sovereign bonds in the secondary market improved expectations by signalling that the ECB 
stands ready to prevent the collapse of sovereign bond markets due to existing fiscal liabilities. 
The indirect effect hints that the ECB reassured investors that sovereigns will not be called upon 
to finance unsustainable contingent fiscal liabilities originating from extensive bank losses, and 
at the same time (indirectly) recapitalised the European banking system. 
 
5.2. Robustness checks  
In this section we provide two robustness checks for the second-stage of our analysis which 
examines the factors affecting the TVP coefficients. First, we use an alternative proxy for 
unconventional monetary policy in the euro area, namely the size of the ECB’s balance sheet, 
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which allows us to expand the time-dimension of the sample.33  Specifically, we re-estimate the 
most extended version of equation (2) reported in column 3 of Table 3 by replacing the first lag 
of the log-difference of securities held for monetary policy purposes (Δshmp) with that of the 
log-difference of the ECB’s balance sheet (Δecbbs). The results in column 1 of Table 5 are based 
upon the same sample used in the baseline analysis (August 2009 - July 2016). Column 2 uses a 
longer sample (July 2004 - July 2016), the starting point of which is dictated by bank CDS data 
availability.  
The results show that over the shorter common period, replacing Δshmp with Δecbbs does 
not affect the findings pertaining to the significant effect of the OMT and banking risk on the 
TVP coefficients of risk factors underlying spreads. Also, in most instances, the insignificant 
effect of conventional monetary policy actions is not overturned. In the full panel, the sign of the 
estimated coefficients indicates that the expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet is typically 
associated with lower sensitivity of spreads to global financial risk and liquidity risk. In the core 
and periphery panels we also identify a significant effect on credit risk, when the latter is proxied 
by expected relative growth.  
When the sample period is expanded, however, the results deteriorate substantially in terms 
of the magnitude and statistical significance of the unconventional monetary policy proxy. This 
finding is not surprising since the longer sample incorporates a substantial period from the first 
(pre-crisis) regime during which unconventional monetary was not present. The statistical 
significance of the OMT dummy in the longer sample verifies that the Draghi announcement 
was instrumental in driving the transition from the second to the third regime. Finally, the effect 
of conventional monetary policy actions becomes significant in the longer sample for BA and 
                                                 
33 For a plot of the level of the ECB’s balance sheet along with the security holdings, see Figure A12 in the 
supplementary Appendix. Both series trend strongly upwards since early 2015 reflecting the ECB’s QE programme.  
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esi. Its sign indicates that expansionary conventional monetary policy (fall in MRO rate) is 
associated with weaker sensitivity of spreads to liquidity risk and credit risk.34 
[Table 5] 
Second, we re-estimate the most extended version of equation (2) using the TVP parameters 
obtained from the full panel including Greece. The results in Table A1 of the supplementary 
Appendix results are in line with the baseline findings since they confirm the important role of 
the OMT announcement and the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy in affecting the 
sensitivity of bond spreads to the risk factors. 
We conduct a final robustness check estimating equation (2) using as dependent variables 
the TVP coefficients obtained by employing the orthogonalized BA series in the first stage 
estimations, which capture more appropriately idiosyncratic variation in liquidity conditions. 
This analysis is motivated by the puzzling finding of a stronger BA TVP coefficient following 
the OMT announcement in the periphery group (see Panel C in Tables 3, 5 and A1 in the 
supplementary Appendix), while at the same time the orthogonalized BA coefficient decreases 
at the end of the sample (see Figure A7 in the supplementary Appendix). The results reported in 
Table A2 of the supplementary Appendix indicate that, overall, our baseline findings remain 
largely unchanged. Focusing on the effect of OMT on the sensitivity of spreads to liquidity 
conditions in the periphery group, the impact of OMT is quantitatively substantially weaker. It 
maintains a significantly positive sign only in column 3. Hence, the improvement in the periphery 
group’s results referring to the TVP coefficient of the orthogonalized BA series depicted in 
Figure A7 relative to Figure 6 is not sufficient to overturn the positive sign of the OMT dummy 
in the most extended specification of Table A2.35  
                                                 
34 Again, this finding is not surprising since the extended sample includes a substantial part of the pre-crisis period, 
when European financial markets were less fragmentated and the transmission mechanism of conventional monetary 
policy, with the MRO rate being one of the key policy instruments, was largely intact. 
35 As we highlight in footnote 12 above, the bid-ask spread captures a specific dimension of liquidity (trading cost). 
It is possible that using other dimensions of liquidity (e.g. trading volume) the finding of a positive sign for the 
OMT dummy on the BA TVP coefficient in the periphery group could be overturned. However, data for these 
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6. Summary and concluding remarks  
In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that ECB policy interventions can affect the 
model used by markets to price EMU sovereign bonds. Our empirical strategy consists of two 
steps. First, we use a TVP panel methodology to model the ten-year government bond yield 
spread against Germany of ten EMU countries on proxies of international financial risk, liquidity 
risk and credit risk over the period January 1999 to July 2016. Second, we estimate the impact 
of ECB interventions on the time-varying sensitivity of spreads to each risk factor, controlling 
for the effects of bank credit risk.  
Our work brings together multiple branches of the literature on the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Our main findings are as follows. First, we present evidence consistent with the predictions 
of theoretical models regarding multiple equilibria and the role of shifts in expectations. Second, 
we find that the announcement of OMT in August 2012 was a game changer for the evolution of 
the European debt crisis, as it led to a new bond-pricing regime. This regime is characterised by 
a weakened link between spreads and fundamentals, but with higher spreads relative to the pre-
crisis era and a residual redenomination risk, carried over from the crisis regime, in the periphery 
countries. Third, we show that ECB policy interventions affect the relationship between spreads 
and fundamentals not only directly, but also indirectly, working through the bank credit risk 
channel. The OMT announcement and the expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet through 
purchases of sovereign bonds expressed the commitment of the ECB to preserve the single 
currency and enabled markets to exit the crisis regime.  
This assessment, however, comes with three important caveats. The first relates to the design 
of the OMT and the conditionality it involves. The markets’ response to the OMT’s introduction 
indicates that the activation of the OMT, if needed in the future, will occur smoothly. There can 
be no guarantee, however, that this expectation will certainly be validated. For example, there 
                                                 
alternative measures of liquidity are not available for the full sample of countries and time-period covered by our 
analysis. 
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may be disagreements among the ESM members, whose unanimous agreement is necessary for 
the OMT’s activation, or there may be difficulties in agreeing the terms of the necessary EMS 
programme with the crisis-hit country. If the activation of the OMT programme is not smooth, 
the unavoidable update of market expectations regarding its role may result in increased 
perceived default/denomination risk. In that case, the stabilizing effects caused by the OMT 
announcement may be moderated, or even fully offset, making a resurgence of the European debt 
crisis possible. 
The second and third caveats relate to unconventional monetary policy. As unconventional 
monetary policy measures have played a significant role in supporting euro area sovereign bonds, 
their reversal in the future may cause renewed market turbulence. Furthermore, the downward 
pressure they exercise on sovereign borrowing costs could be a source of moral hazard in fiscal 
and structural reforms. On this important question, opinions are divided: some authors, including 
Claeys and Leandro (2016) arrive at reassuring conclusions, whereas other contributions, 
including Sinn (2014) and Deutche Bundesbank (2016), strike a much more sceptical tone. Given 
its far-reaching implications, the question merits considerable attention on behalf of academic 
authors. Meanwhile, and as long as the jury is still out, the prudent policy approach would be not 
to discount the risks of financial instability and moral hazard.  
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Figure 1: 10-year government bond yield spreads 
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Note: This figure plots the 10-year government bond yield spreads versus Germany over the period January 1999 - 
July 2016 (211 observations) for ten-euro area countries. Vertical axis: percentage points. The shaded area denotes 
the period July 2007 - July 2012. Source: European Central Bank. 
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Figure 2: ECB monetary policy indicators 
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Note: This figure plots the ECB main refinancing operations rate (MRO) and the amount (in millions of euros) of 
securities held by the ECB for monetary policy purposes (SHMP) over the period July 2009 - July 2016 (85 
observations). Left vertical axis: / – percentage points; Right vertical axis:  – euro millions. Source: European Central 
Bank.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: European banking sector CDS 
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Note: This figure plots the Markit CDS indices covering 25 senior (CDS senior) and junior subordination (CDS 
subordinate) European banks over the period June 2004 - July 2016 (146 observations), measured in basis points. 
The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. Source: Markit  
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Figure 4: TVP coefficients – Full panel excluding Greece 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown.  The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus 
Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index 
relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany 
(ED). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 5: TVP coefficients – Core countries 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the 
Netherlands. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of 
explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-
ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany 
(esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area 
denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 6: TVP coefficients – Periphery countries excluding Greece 
 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
vix
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
BA
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
esi
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
ED  
 
Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The dependent 
variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the 
logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government 
bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead 
expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the period July 
2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 7: TVP coefficients – Full panel including Greece 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown.  The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield 
spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the 
Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected debt-to-GDP ratio relative to 
Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 8: TVP coefficients – Periphery countries including Greece 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables 
includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year 
government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year 
ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the period 
July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 9: TVP coefficients – Full panel – Using orthogonalized bid-ask spread 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus 
Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index (vix), the orthogonalized bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic 
Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio 
relative to Germany (ED). The orthogonalized BA series correspond to the residuals from a fixed effects panel 
regression of BA on vix, esi and ED. The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 10: TVP coefficients – Full panel – Replacing VIX with realised volatility and 
volatility premium 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus 
Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the realised volatility (RV), the volatility premium (VP), the 
bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to 
Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The 
shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 11: TVP coefficients – Full panel – Adding real effective exchange rate 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus 
Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index 
relative to Germany (esi), the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED), 
and the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate (reer). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 
2012. 
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Figure 12: Time effects – Core and periphery countries 
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Note: This figure plots the estimated time effects from Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). The panel of core countries includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands. The 
panel of periphery countries (excluding Greece) includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable 
is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the 
logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government 
bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead 
expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the period July 
2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 13: TVP coefficients – Non-EMU countries 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using 
the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and 
the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables 
includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year 
government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), the 1-year ahead 
expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED), and the logarithm of the real effective 
exchange rate (reer). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure 14: Sentix euro breakup index 
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Note: This figure plots the Sentix euro breakup index over the period June 2012 - July 2016 (50 observations). The 
index measures the proportion (%) of investors (private and institutional) predicting at least one country leaving the 
euro area within the next twelve months. Source: http://www.sentix.de/. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: 10-year government bond yield spreads versus Germany 
 
 AT BE FI FR IE IT NL PT ES EL All+EL All Core Per+EL Per 
1999.01-2016.07 
 Mean 0.320 0.486 0.228 0.300 1.297 1.064 0.202 1.915 1.007 4.353 1.117 0.758 0.307 1.927 1.321 
 StDev 0.279 0.498 0.160 0.300 1.949 1.158 0.160 2.761 1.270 5.896 1.443 0.948 0.279 2.607 1.784 
 RStDev 0.872 1.025 0.703 1.000 1.503 1.088 0.790 1.442 1.261 1.354 1.104 1.076 0.878 1.329 1.323 
1999.01-2007.07 
 Mean 0.142 0.177 0.126 0.083 0.118 0.258 0.084 0.204 0.141 0.535 0.187 0.148 0.123 0.251 0.180 
 StDev 0.102 0.111 0.101 0.041 0.110 0.073 0.058 0.109 0.111 0.518 0.133 0.091 0.083 0.184 0.101 
 RStDev 0.715 0.628 0.804 0.491 0.930 0.282 0.690 0.533 0.788 0.968 0.683 0.651 0.665 0.700 0.633 
2007.08-2012.07 
 Mean 0.596 0.922 0.360 0.509 3.150 1.698 0.337 3.606 1.606 7.233 2.002 1.421 0.545 3.459 2.515 
 StDev 0.339 0.661 0.179 0.372 2.601 1.382 0.170 3.860 1.439 7.869 1.887 1.223 0.344 3.430 2.320 
 RStDev 0.569 0.717 0.498 0.731 0.826 0.814 0.503 1.071 0.896 1.088 0.771 0.736 0.604 0.939 0.901 
2012.08-2016.07 
 Mean 0.355 0.603 0.280 0.505 1.512 2.001 0.286 3.473 2.116 8.945 2.008 1.237 0.406 3.609 2.276 
 StDev 0.112 0.257 0.064 0.154 0.994 0.863 0.097 1.672 1.104 3.595 0.891 0.591 0.137 1.645 1.158 
 RStDev 0.315 0.427 0.228 0.305 0.658 0.431 0.340 0.481 0.521 0.402 0.411 0.412 0.323 0.499 0.523 
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Panel B: Bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds 
 
 AT BE FI FR IE IT NL PT ES EL All+EL All Core Per+EL Per 
1999.01-2016.07 
 Mean 0.204 0.199 0.092 0.110 0.412 0.113 0.083 0.474 0.188 0.567 0.244 0.208 0.138 0.351 0.297 
 StDev 0.183 0.218 0.122 0.092 0.837 0.157 0.070 0.908 0.251 1.064 0.390 0.315 0.137 0.643 0.538 
 RStDev 0.896 1.096 1.324 0.838 2.032 1.386 0.842 1.918 1.335 1.875 1.354 1.296 0.999 1.709 1.668 
1999.01-2007.07 
 Mean 0.076 0.062 0.009 0.057 0.019 0.052 0.058 0.064 0.054 0.068 0.048 0.046 0.053 0.044 0.038 
 StDev 0.036 0.023 0.083 0.043 0.098 0.022 0.055 0.032 0.029 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.045 0.045 
 RStDev 0.473 0.365 9.066 0.749 5.212 0.415 0.946 0.507 0.539 0.682 1.895 2.030 2.320 1.471 1.668 
2007.08-2012.07 
 Mean 0.306 0.237 0.142 0.173 1.182 0.238 0.143 1.205 0.359 1.262 0.525 0.443 0.200 0.849 0.746 
 StDev 0.197 0.214 0.107 0.106 1.157 0.244 0.080 1.386 0.348 1.731 0.557 0.427 0.141 0.973 0.784 
 RStDev 0.645 0.905 0.755 0.613 0.979 1.026 0.556 1.150 0.971 1.372 0.897 0.844 0.695 1.100 1.031 
2012.08-2016.07 
 Mean 0.353 0.445 0.208 0.144 0.374 0.089 0.060 0.439 0.263 0.771 0.315 0.264 0.242 0.387 0.291 
 StDev 0.163 0.219 0.072 0.086 0.513 0.075 0.025 0.470 0.214 0.294 0.213 0.204 0.113 0.313 0.318 
 RStDev 0.460 0.492 0.347 0.602 1.374 0.840 0.419 1.071 0.816 0.381 0.680 0.714 0.464 0.897 1.025 
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Panel C: Log of economic sentiment index relative to Germany 
 
 AT BE FI FR IE IT NL PT ES EL All+EL All Core Per+EL Per 
1999.01-2016.07 
 Mean 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.005 -0.009 0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.001 
 StDev 0.029 0.026 0.034 0.034 0.012 0.040 0.031 0.044 0.046 0.063 0.036 0.033 0.031 0.041 0.036 
 RStDev 8.645 4.091 6.266 3.645 32.657 9.700 43.620 9.256 9.705 6.704 13.429 14.176 13.253 13.604 15.329 
1999.01-2007.07 
 Mean 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.036 0.006 0.030 0.020 0.018 0.039 0.036 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.023 
 StDev 0.022 0.019 0.028 0.021 0.008 0.028 0.020 0.024 0.032 0.028 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.023 
 RStDev 0.865 0.761 1.044 0.585 1.331 0.921 1.002 1.356 0.827 0.774 0.947 0.966 0.852 1.042 1.109 
2007.08-2012.07 
 Mean -0.008 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.014 -0.017 -0.019 -0.029 -0.040 -0.053 -0.019 -0.015 -0.007 -0.031 -0.025 
 StDev 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.007 0.040 0.030 0.057 0.035 0.072 0.033 0.028 0.023 0.042 0.035 
 RStDev 2.277 3.360 6.087 7.045 0.508 2.320 1.594 1.992 0.880 1.356 2.742 2.896 4.073 1.411 1.425 
2012.08-2016.07 
 Mean -0.028 -0.018 -0.037 -0.031 0.006 -0.024 -0.022 -0.023 -0.013 -0.051 -0.024 -0.021 -0.027 -0.021 -0.014 
 StDev 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.009 0.029 0.021 0.034 0.024 0.030 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.025 0.024 
 RStDev 0.399 0.660 0.393 0.421 1.614 1.169 0.931 1.482 1.942 0.579 0.959 1.001 0.561 1.357 1.552 
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Panel D: 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany 
 
 AT BE FI FR IE IT NL PT ES EL All+EL All Core Per+EL Per 
1999.01-2016.07  
 Mean -0.529 29.700 -22.161 5.945 -6.035 45.668 -9.361 13.320 -4.493 57.609 10.966 5.784 0.719 21.214 12.115 
 StDev 6.842 10.694 8.231 10.393 32.506 8.285 6.975 22.404 19.720 30.327 15.638 14.006 8.627 22.649 20.729 
 RStDev 12.924 0.360 0.371 1.748 5.386 0.181 0.745 1.682 4.389 0.526 2.831 3.087 3.230 2.433 2.910 
1999.01-2007.07 
 Mean -0.824 34.903 -22.351 -1.983 -31.850 43.451 -9.523 -3.149 -12.969 38.023 3.373 -0.477 0.044 6.701 -1.129 
 StDev 3.864 11.339 4.565 1.043 7.245 5.100 6.441 2.970 12.129 3.872 5.857 6.077 5.450 6.263 6.861 
 RStDev 4.688 0.325 0.204 0.526 0.227 0.117 0.676 0.943 0.935 0.102 0.874 0.960 1.284 0.465 0.556 
2007.08-2012.07 
 Mean -5.372 20.490 -29.622 6.070 3.133 39.933 -14.975 11.652 -14.413 55.600 7.250 1.877 -4.682 19.181 10.076 
 StDev 1.881 2.740 2.591 3.129 28.362 1.988 4.043 11.247 9.358 29.546 9.489 7.260 2.877 16.100 12.739 
 RStDev 0.350 0.134 0.087 0.516 9.052 0.050 0.270 0.965 0.649 0.531 1.260 1.341 0.271 2.249 2.679 
2012.08-2016.07 
 Mean 6.156 30.050 -12.425 22.800 37.900 57.594 -1.994 50.744 26.094 102.150 31.907 24.102 8.918 54.896 43.083 
 StDev 9.825 7.404 9.008 6.328 7.635 6.878 3.325 6.045 8.359 10.446 7.525 7.201 7.178 7.873 7.229 
 RStDev 1.596 0.246 0.725 0.278 0.201 0.119 1.668 0.119 0.320 0.102 0.538 0.586 0.903 0.173 0.190 
 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics, i.e. mean, standard deviation (StDev) and relative standard deviation (RstDev) calculated as the absolute value of the coefficient 
of variation (StDev/Mean), across countries, country-groups and time periods. The sample countries include Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) and Greece (EL). The following country-groups are considered: All countries including Greece (All+EL). All 
countries excluding Greece (All). Core countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands. Periphery countries including Greece: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain (Per+EL). Periphery excluding Greece (Per). The following time periods are considered: January 1999 - July 2016 (211 observations); January 1999 - July 2007 (103 
observations); August 2008 - July 2012 (60 observations); August 2012 - July 2016 (48 observations).   
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of risk factors 
 
Panel A: Full panel 
 
 vix BA esi ED 
vix 1    
BA 0.054 1   
esi 0.097 -0.432 1  
ED -0.075 0.205 -0.126 1 
 
Panel B: Core countries 
 
 vix BA esi ED 
vix 1    
BA -0.013 1   
esi 0.081 -0.407 1  
ED -0.030 0.182 -0.102 1 
 
Panel C: Periphery countries 
 
 vix BA esi ED 
vix 1    
BA 0.086 1   
esi 0.108 -0.502 1  
ED -0.112 0.185 -0.127 1 
 
Note:  This table presents the correlation coefficients for the risk factors, i.e. the logarithm of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of 
the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt 
to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The sample period is January 1999 - July 2017 (211 observations). The 
full panel (Panel A) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain. The panel of core countries (Panel B) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands. The 
panel of periphery countries (Panel C) includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 3: Modelling TVP parameters on ECB policy and bank credit risk 
 
Panel A: Full panel 
 
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.451***  
(0.137)                      
1.471*** 
(0.138)
0.231 
(0.201) 
1.242***  
(0.102)                      
1.279*** 
(0.098)
0.145 
(0.158) 
-15.230***  
(2.133)                      
-16.052*** 
(2.016)  
-4.907* 
(2.566)  
0.033***  
(0.001)                      
0.034*** 
(0.001)
0.033*** 
(0.004) 
DtOMT -1.037*** 
(0.195) 
-1.084*** 
(0.197) 
-0.611*** 
(0.139) 
-0.273 
(0.201) 
-0.326 
(0.202) 
0.106 
(0.117) 
6.259** 
(2.626) 
7.174*** 
(2.494) 
2.926 
(1.849) 
-0.027*** 
(0.004) 
-0.027*** 
(0.004) 
-0.027*** 
(0.004) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.059* 
(0.034) 
0.026* 
(0.015) 
- -0.107*** 
(0.033) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
- 2.357*** 
(0.576) 
1.596*** 
(0.443) 
- -0.0006 
(0.0004) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
ΔMROt-1 - -1.389* 
(0.763) 
0.401 
(0.408) 
- -0.951* 
(0.562) 
0.686 
(0.536) 
- 7.910 
(8.959) 
-8.170 
(6.694) 
- 0.005 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
CDSt-1 - - 0.735*** 
(0.103) 
- - 0.672*** 
(0.100) 
- - -6.605*** 
(1.131) 
- - 0.001 
(0.003) 
Adj R2 0.513 0.526 0.853 0.053 0.078 0.567 0.197 0.276 0.561 0.597 0.588 0.583 
 
Panel B: Core countries 
  
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.087***  
(0.034)                      
1.097*** 
(0.033)
0.403** 
(0.177) 
0.663***  
(0.054)                      
0.680***  
(0.053)                      
0.341***  
(0.059)                      
-3.936***  
(0.360)                      
-4.098***  
(0.330)                      
-0.567  
(0.810)                      
-0.015***  
(0.002)                      
-0.016***  
(0.002)                      
-0.010**  
(0.004)                      
DtOMT -0.647*** 
(0.125) 
-0.671*** 
(0.125) 
-0.406*** 
(0.120) 
-0.615*** 
(0.071) 
-0.632*** 
(0.068) 
-0.503*** 
(0.049) 
2.937*** 
(0.674) 
3.130*** 
(0.659) 
1.784*** 
(0.661) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
- -0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
- 0.463*** 
(0.112) 
0.222*** 
(0.083) 
- 0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
ΔMROt-1 - -0.738* 
(0.414) 
0.263 
(0.454) 
- -0.073 
(0.338) 
0.415* 
(0.237) 
- 2.170 
(2.521) 
-2.924 
(2.421) 
- -0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
CDSt-1 - - 0.411*** 
(0.098) 
- - 0.201*** 
(0.041) 
- - -2.092*** 
(0.480) 
- - -0.003* 
(0.002) 
Adj R2 0.472 0.475 0.715 0.770 0.779 0.882 0.400 0.422 0.678 0.470 0.464 0.486 
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Panel C: Periphery countries 
  
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.103***  
(0.094)                      
1.107*** 
(0.097) 
0.117 
(0.252) 
1.227***  
(0.105)                      
1.253***  
(0.105)                      
0.911**  
(0.454)                      
-18.025***  
(2.884)                      
-19.004***  
(2.786)                      
2.083  
(2.086)                      
0.015***  
(0.003)                      
0.014***  
(0.004)                      
0.044***  
(0.005)                      
DtOMT -0.804*** 
(0.168) 
-0.824*** 
(0.170) 
-0.447** 
(0.177) 
1.300** 
(0.587) 
1.298** 
(0.614) 
1.429** 
(0.559) 
5.338 
(3.785) 
6.552* 
(3.701) 
-1.486 
(2.026) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.011 
(0.024) 
0.056*** 
(0.016) 
- -0.077** 
(0.029) 
-0.053 
(0.034) 
- 2.810*** 
(0.760) 
1.370*** 
(0.407) 
- 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
ΔMROt-1 - -0.788 
(0.749) 
0.641 
(0.546) 
- 1.101 
(1.190) 
1.595 
(1.029) 
- 15.410 
(12.888) 
-15.016* 
(8.317) 
- 0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
CDSt-1 - - 0.587*** 
(0.128) 
- - 0.203 
(0.265) 
- - -12.497*** 
(1.078) 
- - -0.018*** 
(0.003) 
Adj R2 0.432 0.428 0.719 0.124 0.106 0.099 0.068 0.127 0.667 0.102 0.113 0.543 
 
Note:  This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (in parentheses) of Equation (2) over the period August 2009 - 
July 2016 (84 observations). The dependent variable is, respectively, the time-varying panel coefficient of Equation (1) associated with the logarithm of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index (βtvix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (βtBA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (βtesi), 
and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (βtED). The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
since August 2012 and 0 otherwise (DtOMT), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of securities held for monetary policy purposes by the ECB (Δshmpt-1), the first difference 
of the ECB main refinancing operations rate (ΔMROt-1), and the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index (CDSt-1). The full panel (Panel A) includes 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The panel of core countries (Panel B) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and 
the Netherlands. The panel of periphery countries (Panel C) includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: The impact of ECB policy on bank credit risk 
 
 CDS senior CDS subordinate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 1.695*** 
(0.217) 
1.744*** 
(0.211) 
0.277 
(0.313) 
0.217 
(0.263) 
2.892*** 
(0.393) 
2.967*** 
(0.387) 
0.154 
(0.561) 
-0.025 
(0.532) 
DtOMT -0.640*** 
(0.237) 
-0.724*** 
(0.232) 
-0.163** 
(0.062) 
-0.163*** 
(0.054) 
-1.014** 
(0.419) 
-1.144*** 
(0.419) 
-0.237** 
(0.105) 
-0.207** 
(0.089) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.141*** 
(0.039) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.029*** 
(0.008) 
- -0.213*** 
(0.063) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
ΔMROt-1 - -1.875* 
(1.010) 
0.271 
(0.331) 
0.242 
(0.291) 
- -3.002 
(1.947) 
0.305 
(0.498) 
0.368 
(0.432) 
vixt-1 - - 0.001 
(0.226) 
0.216 
(0.209) 
- - 0.317 
(0.424) 
0.615 
(0.425) 
Δeesit-1 - - -2.265 
(1.660) 
-2.555 
(1.649) 
- - -7.683** 
(3.277) 
-7.722** 
(3.200) 
CDSt-1 - - 0.873*** 
(0.038) 
0.582*** 
(0.118) 
- - 0.837*** 
(0.044) 
0.663*** 
(0.103) 
pc1t-1 - - - 0.069** 
(0.028) 
- - - 0.072** 
(0.036) 
Adj R2 0.233 0.296 0.917 0.922 0.212 0.252 0.907 0.910 
 
Note:  This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses) of Equation (3) over the period August 2009 - July 2016 (84 observations). The dependent variable is, 
respectively, the European banking sector senior (CDS senior) and junior subordination (CDS subordinate) CDS index. 
The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise 
(DtOMT), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of securities held for monetary policy purposes by the ECB 
(Δshmpt-1), the first difference of the ECB main refinancing operations rate (ΔMROt-1), the lagged logarithm of the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vixt-1), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of the euro area 
Economic Sentiment Index (Δeesit-1), the lagged respective CDS index (CDSt-1), and the lagged first principal 
component of spreads (pc1t-1). The latter is calculated using the full set of countries (including Greece) over the period 
January 1999 - July 2016.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Modelling TVP parameters on ECB policy and bank credit risk – Using ECB balance sheet 
 
Panel A: Full panel 
 
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 0.249 
(0.188) 
0.016 
(0.062) 
0.117 
(0.148) 
-0.107** 
(0.044) 
-3.592 
(2.735)  
-2.634*** 
(0.776)  
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
DtOMT -0.640*** 
(0.131) 
-0.530*** 
(0.079) 
0.097 
(0.109) 
0.263** 
(0.131) 
2.376 
(2.012) 
-1.893 
(1.874) 
-0.026*** 
(0.004) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Δecbbst-1 -2.264** 
(1.069) 
-0.663 
(0.592) 
-3.211** 
(1.530) 
-1.229 
(0.791) 
30.737 
(19.297) 
14.480 
(9.839) 
0.141*** 
(0.043) 
0.052* 
(0.027) 
ΔMROt-1 0.334 
(0.323) 
-0.067 
(0.152) 
0.635 
(0.430) 
0.730*** 
(0.190) 
-8.582 
(7.530) 
-14.26*** 
(3.930) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
CDSt-1 0.747*** 
(0.094) 
0.850*** 
(0.049) 
0.706*** 
(0.096) 
0.759*** 
(0.049) 
-7.294*** 
(1.171) 
-9.183*** 
(0.835) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Adj R2 0.864 0.863 0.610 0.785 0.545 0.652 0.662 0.466 
 
Panel B: Core countries 
  
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 0.415** 
(0.159) 
0.105* 
(0.057) 
0.321*** 
(0.060) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.372 
(0.750)  
-0.337 
(0.209)  
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
DtOMT -0.438*** 
(0.102) 
-0.276**** 
(0.077) 
-0.493*** 
(0.047) 
-0.322*** 
(0.042) 
1.779*** 
(0.582) 
1.588*** 
(0.436) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Δecbbst-1 -2.999*** 
(0.872) 
1.059* 
(0.602) 
-0.271 
(0.394) 
-0.145 
(0.230) 
14.053*** 
(4.924) 
4.739 
(3.106) 
-0.038 
(0.029) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
ΔMROt-1 0.184 
(0.336) 
0.041 
(0.111) 
0.426* 
(0.243) 
0.470*** 
(0.121) 
-2.767 
(1.848) 
-3.051*** 
(0.734) 
-0.022** 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
CDSt-1 0.430*** 
(0.087) 
0.561*** 
(0.055) 
0.210*** 
(0.041) 
0.324*** 
(0.036) 
-2.268*** 
(0.431) 
-2.123*** 
(0.241) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
Adj R2 0.765 0.774 0.878 0.776 0.717 0.677 0.500 0.444 
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Panel C: Periphery countries 
  
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 0.159 
(0.237) 
0.104 
(0.070) 
0.882** 
(0.433) 
-0.196 
(0.165) 
-3.242 
(2.311)  
-4.165*** 
(0.773)  
0.045*** 
(0.004) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
DtOMT -0.493*** 
(0.166) 
-0.496*** 
(0.104) 
1.541*** 
(0.562) 
2.049*** 
(0.673) 
-1.778 
(2.035) 
-3.540* 
(2.092) 
-0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
Δecbbst-1 -2.209** 
(1.201) 
-0.711 
(0.701) 
11.775 
(7.795) 
4.307 
(3.509) 
50.966** 
(24.793) 
19.541 
(13.078) 
0.153*** 
(0.040) 
0.054* 
(0.031) 
ΔMROt-1 0.546 
(0.485) 
-0.345* 
(0.190) 
1.890* 
(1.031) 
1.001** 
(0.413) 
-14.830* 
(8.052) 
-17.28*** 
(4.225) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
CDSt-1 0.593*** 
(0.120) 
0.627*** 
(0.061) 
0.121 
(0.288) 
0.633*** 
(0.150) 
-13.29*** 
(1.121) 
-12.54*** 
(0.704) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
Adj R2 0.736 0.737 0.153 0.408 0.687 0.756 0.664 0.199 
 
Note:  This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (in parentheses) of Equation (2) over the periods August 2009 - 
July 2016 (Column 1; 84 observations) and July 2004 - July 2016 (Column 2, 145 observations). The dependent variable is, respectively, the time-varying panel coefficient of 
Equation (1) associated with the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (βtvix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (βtBA), the logarithm 
of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (βtesi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (βtED). The set of 
explanatory variables includes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise (DtOMT), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of the ECB balance 
sheet (Δecbbst-1), the first difference of the ECB main refinancing operations rate (ΔMROt-1), and the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index (CDSt-
1). The full panel (Panel A) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The panel of core countries (Panel B) includes 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands. The panel of periphery countries (Panel C) includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix: Table A1 - Data Description and Sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Spread  10-year bond yield spread against German bund ECB  
vix Logarithm of Chicago board options exchange volatility 
index 
Bloomberg 
RV Realised volatility of S&P 500 https://sites.google.com/site/haozhouspersonalhomepage/ 
VRP Volatility premium of S&P 500 https://sites.google.com/site/haozhouspersonalhomepage/ 
BA 10-year bond bid-ask spread Bloomberg 
esi Logarithm of Economic Sentiment Index relative to 
Germany 
Eurostat 
ED Expected general government gross debt differential 
against Germany (% of GDP) 
European Commission Economic Forecasts  
reer Logarithm of real effective exchange rate IMF International Financial Statistics  
MRO Main refinancing operations rate (% per annum) ECB 
shmp Logarithm of securities held by the ECB for monetary 
policy purposes, weekly financial statements 
ECB 
ecb Logarithm of ECB balance sheet ECB 
Sentix euro breakup index measures the proportion of investors 
(private and institutional) predicting at least one country 
leaving the euro area within the next twelve months.  
http://www.sentix.de/. 
DOMT Dummy variable equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 
otherwise 
Own calculations 
CDS senior CDS index covering 25 senior subordination European 
Banks 
Markit 
CDS junior CDS index covering 25 senior junior subordination 
European Banks 
Markit 
 
Note: All variables are observed in monthly frequency, except for expected and actual debt differentials, which are observed in semi-annual and quarterly frequency, 
respectively. To transform the semi-annual and quarterly figures into monthly we keep the observations constant for the in-between months 
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Figure A1: Log of VIX 
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Note: This figure plots the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) over the 
period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 observations). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
Source: Chicago Board of Exchange.  
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Figure A2: TVP coefficients and risk factors – Full panel  
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Note: This figure plots time-varying panel (TVP) beta coefficients against vix and the average value of the 
remaining three risk factors (BA, esi and ED) calculated across countries for each time period. The former 
correspond to non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) 
to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread 
of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), 
and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area 
denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A3: TVP coefficients – Full panel – Using first lag of regressors 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated 
using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 
0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield 
spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the lagged logarithm of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the lagged bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the lagged 
logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the lagged 1-year ahead expected gross 
government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 
2012. 
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Figure A4: TVP coefficients – Full panel – Alternative bandwidth parameters 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations), using four alternative values for the bandwidth parameter: h = 0.15, 0.10, 0.20 and 0.30. In all 
cases, the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) is set to 0.08. Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The 
panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The 
dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables 
includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-
year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 
1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes 
the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A5: TVP coefficients - Full panel – Alternative bandwidth correction parameters 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations), using three alternative values for the bandwidth correction parameter: ε = 0.08, 0.05 and 0.10. In 
all cases, the bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 0.15. Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals (dotted lines), calculated using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The panel 
includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent 
variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes 
the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year 
government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-
year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the 
period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A6: TVP coefficients – Core countries – Using orthogonalized bid-ask spread 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated 
using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 
0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France 
and the Netherlands. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The 
set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), 
the orthogonalized bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment 
Index relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to 
Germany (ED). The orthogonalized BA series correspond to the residuals from a fixed effects panel regression of 
BA on vix, esi and ED. The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A7: TVP coefficients – Periphery countries – Using orthogonalized bid-ask 
spread 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated 
using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 
0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory 
variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the 
orthogonalized bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index 
relative to Germany (esi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany 
(ED). The orthogonalized BA series correspond to the residuals from a fixed effects panel regression of BA on 
vix, esi and ED. The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A8: TVP coefficients – Full panel – Replacing expected debt with actual debt 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated 
using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 
0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield 
spread versus Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the 
Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (esi), and the actual gross government debt to GDP ratio relative 
to Germany (ED). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A9: TVP coefficients – Non-EMU countries including Switzerland 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated 
using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 
0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Denmark, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus Germany. 
The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Business Confidence Index 
relative to Germany (esi), the actual gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (ED), and the 
logarithm of the real effective exchange rate (reer). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - July 2012. 
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Figure A10: TVP coefficients – Non-EMU countries including Switzerland and Norway 
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Note: This figure plots non-parametric estimates of Equation (1) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 
observations). Time-varying panel (TVP) coefficients and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines), calculated 
using the wild bootstrap method (1000 iterations), are shown. The estimation bandwidth parameter (h) is set to 
0.15 and the bandwidth correction parameter (ε) to 0.08. The panel includes Denmark, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. The dependent variable is the 10-year government bond yield spread versus 
Germany. The set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index (vix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (BA), the logarithm of the Business 
Confidence Index relative to Germany (esi), the actual gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany 
(ED), and the logarithm of the real effective exchange rate (reer). The shaded area denotes the period July 2007 - 
July 2012. 
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Figure A11: First principal component of spreads 
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Note: This figure plots the first principal component of spreads, calculated using the full set of countries (including 
Greece) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 (211 observations). The shaded area denotes the period July 
2007 - July 2012.  
 
 
 
Figure A12: ECB balance sheet and securities held for monetary policy purposes 
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Note: This figure plots the ECB balance sheet size (in millions of euros) over the period January 1999 - July 2016 
(211 observations) and the amount of securities held by the ECB for monetary policy purposes (SHMP) over the 
period July 2009 - July 2016 (85 observations). Source: European Central Bank.  
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Table A1: Modelling TVP parameters on ECB policy and bank credit risk – Including 
Greece 
 
 Full panel Periphery countries 
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
Constant -0.204 
(0.351) 
1.002*** 
(0.279) 
-2.516 
(3.025) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
-0.563 
(0.394) 
1.862*** 
(0.437) 
9.640*** 
(3.797) 
0.064*** 
(0.009) 
DtOMT -0.376 
(0.252) 
1.337*** 
(0.193) 
7.489*** 
(2.694) 
-0.066*** 
(0.008) 
-0.248 
(0.376) 
1.775*** 
(0.291) 
7.081 
(4.341) 
-0.083*** 
(0.007) 
Δshmpt-1 0.016 
(0.031) 
-0.042* 
(0.026) 
1.580*** 
(0.589) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.033 
(0.061) 
-0.069** 
(0.031) 
1.686** 
(0.809) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
ΔMROt-1 0.984 
(1.000) 
-0.036 
(0.617) 
-10.021 
(11.230) 
0.010 
(0.032) 
1.472 
(1.370) 
-0.651 
(1.019) 
-17.999 
(18.810) 
-0.009 
(0.030) 
CDSt-1 1.465*** 
(0.197) 
-0.096 
(0.156) 
-12.34*** 
(1.461) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
2.220*** 
(0.220) 
-0.654*** 
(0.247) 
-22.56*** 
(2.056) 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
Adj R2 0.692 0.749 0.623 0.837 0.616 0.783 0.615 0.854 
 
Note:  This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (in 
parentheses) of Equation (2) over the period August 2009 - July 2016 (84 observations). The dependent variable 
is, respectively, the time-varying panel coefficient of Equation (1) associated with the logarithm of the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (βtvix), the bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (βtBA), the 
logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to Germany (βtesi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross 
government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (βtED). The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise (DtOMT), the lagged first difference of the logarithm 
of securities held for monetary policy purposes by the ECB (Δshmpt-1), the first difference of the ECB main 
refinancing operations rate (ΔMROt-1), and the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index 
(CDSt-1). The full panel includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. The panel of periphery countries includes Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. *, **, 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table A2: Modelling TVP parameters on ECB policy and bank credit risk – Using orthogonalized bid-ask spread 
 
Panel A: Full panel 
 
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.925***  
(0.173)                      
1.961*** 
(0.173)
0.256 
(0.249) 
1.267***  
(0.083)                      
1.302*** 
(0.082)
0.238 
(0.213) 
-21.175***  
(2.471)                      
-22.150*** 
(2.352)  
-5.720** 
(2.664)  
0.047***  
(0.002)                      
0.047*** 
(0.002)
0.036*** 
(0.004) 
DtOMT -1.226*** 
(0.277) 
-1.301*** 
(0.278) 
-0.651*** 
(0.187) 
-0.453* 
(0.258) 
-0.518** 
(0.260) 
-0.113 
(0.212) 
8.709** 
(3.550) 
9.917*** 
(3.430) 
3.654 
(2.270) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
-0.035*** 
(0.004) 
-0.030*** 
(0.004) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.105** 
(0.052) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
- -0.100** 
(0.047) 
-0.027 
(0.031) 
- 2.797*** 
(0.772) 
1.675*** 
(0.548) 
- -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004) 
ΔMROt-1 - -1.987** 
(0.974) 
0.473 
(0.674) 
- -1.600** 
(0.715) 
-0.065 
(0.809) 
- 15.311 
(11.527) 
-8.394 
(9.646) 
- -0.001 
(0.018) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
CDSt-1 - - 1.010*** 
(0.134) 
- - 0.630*** 
(0.131) 
- - -9.737*** 
(1.364) 
- - 0.007*** 
(0.002) 
Adj R2 0.419 0.439 0.801 0.087 0.107 0.338 0.192 0.250 0.561 0.700 0.696 0.725 
 
Panel B: Core countries 
  
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.321***  
(0.044)                      
1.336*** 
(0.043)
0.535*** 
(0.178) 
0.653***  
(0.054)                      
0.670***  
(0.053)                      
0.318***  
(0.060)                      
-7.298***  
(0.644)                      
-7.553***  
(0.600)                      
-2.539 ** 
(1.023)                      
-0.012***  
(0.001)                      
-0.012***  
(0.001)                      
-0.007**  
(0.003)                      
DtOMT -0.902*** 
(0.135) 
-0.932*** 
(0.135) 
-0.626*** 
(0.122) 
-0.608*** 
(0.072) 
-0.625*** 
(0.069) 
-0.491*** 
(0.049) 
6.301*** 
(0.970) 
6.569*** 
(0.924) 
4.658*** 
(0.837) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.044** 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
- -0.048*** 
(0.011) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
- 0.731*** 
(0.156) 
0.388*** 
(0.115) 
- 0.000 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
ΔMROt-1 - -0.755 
(0.499) 
0.401 
(0.460) 
- -0.071 
(0.335) 
0.436* 
(0.236) 
- 1.723 
(4.010) 
-5.511* 
(3.005) 
- -0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.009) 
CDSt-1 - - 0.475*** 
(0.101) 
- - 0.208*** 
(0.041) 
- - -2.971*** 
(0.581) 
- - -0.003 
(0.002) 
Adj R2 0.600 0.604 0.813 0.759 0.768 0.879 0.627 0.645 0.819 0.402 0.396 0.417 
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Panel C: Periphery countries 
  
 βtvix βtBA βtesi βtED 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.530***  
(0.121)                      
1.549*** 
(0.124) 
0.255 
(0.254) 
1.261***  
(0.086)                      
1.296***  
(0.082)                      
0.547***  
(0.127)                      
-23.850***  
(3.232)                      
-24.968***  
(3.116)                      
-1.439  
(2.457)                      
0.027***  
(0.003)                      
0.026***  
(0.003)                      
0.057***  
(0.005)                      
DtOMT -0.756*** 
(0.218) 
-0.798*** 
(0.222) 
-0.305 
(0.188) 
0.070 
(0.174) 
0.018 
(0.173) 
0.303** 
(0.131) 
4.611 
(4.268) 
6.017 
(4.170) 
-2.952 
(2.277) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
Δshmpt-1 - -0.053 
(0.038) 
0.035* 
(0.018) 
- -0.010*** 
(0.035) 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
- 3.209*** 
(0.878) 
1.601*** 
(0.487) 
- 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
ΔMROt-1 - -1.201 
(0.817) 
0.665 
(0.595) 
- -1.014** 
(0.453) 
0.067 
(0.517) 
- 18.534 
(14.082) 
-15.416 
(9.619) 
- 0.033* 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.020) 
CDSt-1 - - 0.766*** 
(0.133) 
- - 0.444*** 
(0.079) 
- - -13.944*** 
(1.291) 
- - -0.018*** 
(0.003) 
Adj R2 0.295 0.298 0.687 0.000 0.032 0.318 0.036 0.101 0.649 0.048 0.055 0.379 
 
Note:  This table presents OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (in parentheses) of Equation (2) over the period August 2009 - 
July 2016 (84 observations). The dependent variable is, respectively, the time-varying panel coefficient of Equation (1) associated with the logarithm of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index (βtvix), the orthogonalized bid-ask spread of 10-year government bonds (βtBA), the logarithm of the Economic Sentiment Index relative to 
Germany (βtesi), and the 1-year ahead expected gross government debt to GDP ratio relative to Germany (βtED). The orthogonalized BA series correspond to the residuals from 
a fixed effects panel regression of BA on vix, esi and ED. The set of explanatory variables includes a dummy variable that is equal to 1 since August 2012 and 0 otherwise 
(DtOMT), the lagged first difference of the logarithm of securities held for monetary policy purposes by the ECB (Δshmpt-1), the first difference of the ECB main refinancing 
operations rate (ΔMROt-1), and the lagged European banking sector senior subordination CDS index (CDSt-1). The full panel (Panel A) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The panel of core countries (Panel B) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands. The panel of 
periphery countries (Panel C) includes Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
